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ABSTRACT   
 
This honors thesis examines the underlying causes that led to the shift in electoral 
support from Barack Obama to Donald Trump. White status anxiety led to an increase of 
voters in the white working class, the demographic primarily responsible for the election 
of Donald Trump. By studying the question of what led to the polarizing presidential 
election of Trump, this thesis contributes to knowledge of underlying policy tensiosn in 
America. This diagnosis will lead to better policy that addresses underlying tensions 
racial status and gender status. I use two main approaches to address this topic: 1) 
historical research and contextualization and 2) case studies of three counties that 
switched from voting from Obama in 2008 and 2012 to Trump in 2016. I conducted 
qualitative interviews with public officials in each county to understand context and 
attitudes from 2000 to 2016. I find that while each county’s economy remained stable 
during the 2008-2016 time period, each county experienced changing demographics and, 
among white citizens, a perception of a declining status relative to other racial or ethnic 
groups. This racial status anxiety was born from centuries of policies that have 
structurally embedded racial dynamics in American society and were directly addressed 
by Trump in the 2016 election. This finding has implications in policy as it points to the 
need to more explicitly address race and racial equity as underlying and pervasive 
components of American culture, as well as the need to understand the long-term 
consequences of policy decisions in psychological and cultural patterns. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
Context  
 On the morning of November 9, 2016, many Americans woke up in disbelief.  
Donald Trump had been elected as the 45th president of the United States—a shocking 
and puzzling verdict to at least half of America, and apparently to most of the mainstream 
media. Just eight years prior America had elected its first black president, and Barack 
Obama’s victory in 2008 and reelection in 2012 seemed to be indicative of the 
progressive direction the country was moving. America was regarded both at home and 
abroad as a place of inclusivity and progress. The election of Trump stood in sharp 
contrast, and prompted many to question the nation’s core values. As Patrick Healy and 
Jeremy Peters of the New York Times (2016) reported, “The American political 
establishment reeled on [November 9] as leaders in both parties began coming to grips 
with four years of President Donald J. Trump in the White House, a once-unimaginable 
scenario.” However, a notable handful of commentators were underwhelmed. For 
example, political scientist Larry Bartels concluded, “An extraordinary campaign has 
produced a remarkably ordinary election outcome, primarily reflecting partisan patterns 
familiar from previous election cycles” (Bartels, 2016).  
 Perhaps political pundits such as Bartel were not shocked because this shift is not 
an instance of American exceptionalism. Political movements with decisively nationalist 
messages are happening across the western world. In the opinion of Harvard University 
political theory professor Yascha Mounk, “This is not a unique phenomenon to the 
United States, and 2016 is not a short moment that will pass” (Detrow, 2016). In the 
	 7 
United Kingdom, “Brexit,” the separation of Britain from the European Union, came to 
fruition in June of 2016. In France, it was Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National 
Front, with a platform that vowed to disenfranchise immigrants and favor protectionist 
economics. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany Party, with a message opposed to 
establishment politics, immigration and liberalization, won up to 25 percent of the vote in 
March of 2016. Groups in countries across Europe have had similar success in calling for 
a restriction on immigrations or immigrants themselves, from the Sweden Democrats to 
Jobbik in Hungary to Greece’s neo-fascist party “Golden Dawn” (NYT, 2016). And this 
is just to mention a few.  
There is no shortage of theories as to why Donald Trump was elected. Most fall in 
the following categories: economic changes and concerns, the Russian influence on the 
media, turnout issues among Democrats, highly polarized politics and political distrust, 
the impact of sexism on the race of the nation’s first female presidential major party 
nominee, the fear of societal change and the swing of white working class voters. My 
research indicates that white status anxiety was the primary driver motivating the white 
working class and thus shifting the election from proverbial blue to red. However, each of 
these factors interacted in important ways that resulted in the election of Trump. My 
findings are derived from both historical trends and thematic observations and analysis of 
three bellwether counties that shifted from Obama to Trump this past election. 
Significance  
Despite the extensive media discussions that have followed and attempted to 
explain the Trump election, there is a gap in the literature of theories that address the 
historical context surrounding the 2016 election. Moreover, there is a lack of serious 
	 8 
examination of the role that race played in this historic election and the societal 
implications of the racial politics that played such an important role in the outcome. 
Finally, due to the close proximity of this paper to the occurrence of the 2016 election, 
there are few comprehensive evaluations of this political shift available. The case studies 
completed in this thesis give a more complete and contextualized understanding of 
dynamics and environments that shaped the results of the 2016 election. The case studies 
go beyond a quantitative analysis and draw out important cultural themes across counties.  
Deeper knowledge of historical context of nativism and racial anxiety serve as a 
framework to address tensions evident across the gamut of policy issues.  
Research Question  
The goal of this thesis is to understand the dominant underlying causes that 
resulted in the election of Donald Trump. My approach to understanding this is two-fold. 
First, I examine the history of nativism and nationalism in the United States, particularly 
that involving racial anxiety and anti-immigration political movements and the context in 
which they occurred.  
Second, I conduct case studies on three counties across the United States: 
Macomb County in Michigan, Cedar County in Iowa and Granville County in North 
Carolina. These counties all had majority support for Obama in 2008 and 2012 and then 
for Trump in 2016. They represent different geographical areas of the country and all 
have a different demographic makeup, providing some variation to be able to more 
accurately extrapolate findings from these counties to the wider population of the U.S. 
Cedar County in Iowa has correctly predicted every presidential election since 1992, 
making it an optimal choice to serve as an indicator county. Macomb County, in the 
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suburbs of Detroit, has been the focus of a number of different pieces of literature, due to 
its striking turnaround from firmly blue to red, tipping Michigan to Trump (Schulzke, 
2016).  Granville County in North Carolina is perched in the middle of a swing state, 
making it a pivotal county for Trump’s victory in North Carolina.  
My Hypothesis 
 My hypothesis is that white status anxiety caused an increase of white working 
class voters to go vote for Trump. (The white working class is defined as people without 
college degrees or salaried jobs.) The economy functioned only as a mechanism through 
which racial anxiety affected white nationalism and nativism. Any economic change that 
impacted whites and minorities disparately contributed to a fear of a decline in the status 
of the white working class. This anxiety has been created and embedded through policy 
and rhetoric throughout American history. In 2016, concerns about declining white status, 
immigration, greater minority influence and gender were particularly central. These 
concerns drove different voters to show up and vote for Trump in 2016.  
Roadmap  
Overall my thesis will provide an overview of the current literature seeking to 
explain the results of the 2016 election as well as the literature on historical patterns of 
racial anxiety, nationalism and nativism and wide voter swings.  It will also analyze three 
case studies of cultural, demographic, economic and voting patterns of three counties. 
Finally, it will present the results and my analysis of this information. Chapter 2 
examines the body of literature and research on the 2016 presidential election. It also 
provides a fuller perspective of the history of racial rhetoric, nativism and nationalism in 
America. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology, data collection and sources that will be 
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used in my thesis. Chapter 4 presents the results from three case studies and connects 
historical data to current trends and events. This chapter will further discuss the strengths 
and weaknesses of my findings and data and its resulting relevance and robustness. 
Chapter 5 will offer an analysis of these results. Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss policy 
implications.  
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THEORIES OF SHIFTS IN THE 2016 
ELECTION  
 
It would be impossible to write this paper without acknowledging the vast number 
of theories that attempt to explain the shift from Barack Obama to Donald Trump. This 
chapter will review the existing literature on dominant theories that have emerged in the 
midst of and following the 2016 election. These main themes include populism and the 
economy; Russian influence on the elections; gender; and failings of the Democratic 
party; and anxiety over race and status.   
Populism and the Economy  
Many scholars and pundits have published pieces that point to the shock many 
Americans felt when Donald Trump was elected. However, another body of literature, 
albeit smaller in scope, finds the election of Trump to be unsurprising and almost 
predictable. Scholars discuss Trump’s election to be the result of another populist rising 
to power by addressing economic, race and class frustrations.  
Only twice since 1828 have the Democrats won a presidential election after their 
candidate won two prior elections. It happened once in 1836, when the Democratic Vice 
President Martin Van Buren succeeded Andrew Jackson by defeating four Whig 
candidates and once when President Franklin D. Roosevelt became his own successor in 
1940 by running for a third (and fourth) term (Constitution Daily, 2013). The 
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Republicans have fared slightly better with Ulysses S. Grant (1868), Rutherford B. Hayes 
(1876), Theodore Roosevelt (1904), and George H.W. Bush (1988) winning the election 
for their party for the third time (Constitution Daily, 2013). However, this pattern does 
not explain voters’ selection of Donald Trump as the Republican nominee over more 
mainstream options.  
Populism generally calls for “kicking out the political establishment,” but it often 
does not answer who should replace it—and therefore is often paired with ideologies 
from both ends of the political spectrum from far left to far right (Muddle, 2017, p. 2). 
Michael Kazin, a Georgetown University historian, has studied populism throughout his 
career. Recently, he examined the Trump phenomenon through the lens of the history of 
American Populism in his journal article “Old Whine New Bottles” (2016). Kazin 
describes two separate and competing traditions of populism in the United States, both 
recurrent throughout our history. Often populists rise to prominence in tandem with a 
declining economy or significant loss of jobs (Kazin, 2017, p. 5)  
There are two competing trends of populism in the United States. The first group 
defines “the people” strictly as a matter of class, and look at the elite as having 
“betrayed” the interests of the men and women that make up the core of America’s 
workforce (Kazin, 2017, p.4). Many scholars place Trump within the second tradition of 
populism. This defines “the people” more narrowly than the first tradition. While they 
believe there is a necessary take-down of the elite, they also find poor groups that are not 
of European heritage to be unworthy in their own ways as well. Their belief is that these 
two groups “imperil the interests and values of the patriotic (white) majority in the 
middle.” Gerstle labels this “racial nationalism,” defined as “America in ethno racial 
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terms, as a people held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherited 
fitness for self-government” (Gerstle, 2016, p.5).  John Judis, journalist and author of The 
Populist Explosion (2016), writes about the second strain of populism as defending a 
different grouping of people: the elite who they believe help outsiders such as immigrants 
and Islamists at a disproportionate rate to the sect of America “deserving” of this support. 
Kazin  writes that Trump’s appeal falls directly in line with the racial-nationalist 
group. The way Trump defines “the people,” or rather, the way he lacks a coherent 
description of the people he speaks for, seems to follow a recent trend in American 
populism. Kazin accounts for Trump’s lack of a clear description as an effect of the 
increasing multiculturism in the United States. He believes no one, even Trump, can 
afford to talk about “the people” and clearly exclude those not identifying as white or 
Christian. For this reason, Trump does not explicitly define his people as such, although 
he clearly illustrates those who he is against, from Mexicans and Muslims to “Crooked 
Hillary” and “Lyin’ Ted.”   
Trump’s “racist-nationalist” brand of populism often arises in times of crisis 
(Judis, 2016). In The Populist Explosion, Judis walks through populist movements in 
history and demonstrates how populism has encapsulated both economic and political 
grievances over time. In many instances they reflect the movement Trump ushered in. 
Populism began with the people’s party as early as the 1880’s, as “middle American 
radicalism,” which seemingly reflects the basis of Trump’s challenge to the Republican 
establishment. A pattern is demonstrated from the Farmers Alliance predating the 1900s 
that wanted the government to combat economic injustice as well as ban Chinese 
immigrants to George Wallace in 1960—preaching conservatism only when it came to 
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domestic issues, particularly those involving race. Judis argues that Wallace laid the 
foundations for Trump to challenge the Republican establishment by creating a new 
right-wing form of populism in 1963. To Judis, Trump’s alignment with nativist, anti-
immigration and anti-trade views and his self-appointed position as the “champion of the 
silent majority” makes him another figure of the populist movement in a long line of 
successors. This, he argues has always been at the core of the movement’s refrain.  
Judis believes that populist campaign “often function as warning signs of a 
political crisis.” For example, in the United States populist movements succeed at times 
when the current establishment is viewed as continuing to push policy and norms that are 
at odds with “their own hopes, fears and concerns” (Judis, 2016). Trump addressed the 
fears that grew among certain demographics in the Obama era. Political experts observed 
Trump  “playing on racist opposition to Barack Obama’s presidency or exploiting a latent 
sympathy for fascism among working class white Americans” (Judis, 2016).  
Scholars also note populist movements in American history largely play on 
economic grievances. Richard Worsnop stipulates in his 1972 publication The New 
Populism that populism has often thrived in times of economic distress of sorts and faded 
as prosperity regained its foothold. Chris Lehman (2015) writes that Trump falls in line 
with a long-standing populist tradition, reviving the “old populist cause of economic 
nationalism.” For example, he writes that the populist movement in the late 19th century 
was based on economic grievances. Leaders of the movement sought to unite the working 
class—from farmers to businessmen to shop workers—in order to overcome what 
Lehmann describes as “the industrial age’s regime of market cartels, debt peonage and 
degraded wage labor.” In this day and age, Trump speaks to those who believe 
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globalization is only hurting their earnings and have a protectionist outlook on wages—
believing immigration is pulling them down. Michael Lind, co-founder of the New 
America Foundation and the author of Land of Promise: An Economic History of the 
United States (2013) agrees with this notion:   
“Progressives insist that mass immigration doesn’t lower wages. But up until the decline 
of the labor wing of the Democrats in the 1990s, labor took the opposite view. If you are 
an American or European populist, and you don't trust benevolent government to 
manipulate tax credits or make transfer payments to give you a middle class income, then 
creating a tighter labor market by restricting immigration and also by protectionism 
makes sense, given your interests.”  
 
While some scholars write that Trump’s brand of populism successfully played on 
economic tensions of the white working class, other scholars discuss a different but 
related phenomenon: the failure of the Democrats to address economic woes of the 
working class. Priorities USA found the voters who switched from Obama to Trump were 
more likely to think more Democrats look out for the wealthy over the poor (Edsall, 
2017). Greenberg believes frustrations began during the Obama administration. While 
working class incomes declined, Obama seemed to bail out “irresponsible elites” in the 
name of economic progress. Clinton then dug the grave deeper, Greenberg says, by 
ignoring economic stress among working-class women and even minorities, millennials, 
and unmarried women, typically part of the Democratic base. Griffin, Halpin and 
Teixeira (2017) write in an essay, “Democrats allowed themselves to become the party of 
the status quo — a status quo perceived to be elitist, exclusionary, and disconnected from 
the entire range of working-class concerns, but particularly from those voters in white 
working-class areas.”  
Foer (2017) writes that the Democrats did a poor job in “attuning themselves” to 
what may have been the largest issues of the election: the declining wages of the middle 
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class and the perception of the privileged elite. Joan C. Williams, a professor at the 
University of California Hastings College of the Law and author of the 2017 book White 
Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America, critiques the Democrats’ 
inability to understand this constituency. Rather than moving on from identify politics, 
she suggests Democrats would have fared far better had they remembered the role social 
class played in voting. She highlights the seemingly overlooked misfortunes of the white 
working class by Democrats; while the typical white working class household income 
doubled during the three decades following World War II, incomes have not risen (at 
adjusted rates) since. Further, the death rate for both middle-aged men and women in the 
white working class increased 1993 to 2013, and almost 20% more white children live in 
impoverished neighborhoods now than in 1970. She does not believe courting the 
working class involves Democrats simply moving to the center, favoring trade 
agreements and the Wall Street elite, which she believes further alienates this group.  
Literature on populism in the 2016 election also addresses how Trump’s rhetoric 
mimicked that of other prominent populists. Cas Mudde, co-author of Populism: A Very 
Short Introduction, adds to the body of literature on Donald Trump’s populism by 
analyzing patterns in the Trump campaign that compare to definitions of populism. 
Mudde believes that while Trump did not begin as a populist, he styled himself to be on 
over the course of his campaign. He illustrates how his rhetoric moved to a self-centered 
narrative: “Our country needs a truly great leader” (Trump wrote in The Art of the Deal), 
to one that echoed that of a populist movement for “the people.” “January 20th 2017, will 
be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again.” While 
Trump used iterations of “I” 256 times in his presidential announcement speech, “I” or 
	 16 
the like was only used a mere three times in his inaugural address. Beyond this rhetoric, 
Mudde notes that Trump promoted a nativist attitude towards immigrants and opposed 
elites, which are classic indicators of populism.  
Pippa Norris, professor at Harvard University, found parallels between traditional 
populist movements and that of Trump. “Stylistically, populists often use short, simple 
slogans and direct language, and engage in boorish behavior, which makes [them] appear 
like the real people. They are typically transgressive on all the rules of the game.” 
Further, she explains why populism is likely to fade again, despite its current rise to 
prominence. When populists come into real power they “actually have to deal with things 
on a daily basis, they often become more moderate as they gradually learn that bomb-
throwing doesn’t work when they’re trying to get things done,” Norris explains.  Over 
time, they lose their power as they lose their appeal of a political outsider. 
Mudde also asserts that Trump further followed another populist tradition of 
attempting to undermine powers that challenge his authority—including courts, media 
and other parties. Trump consistently campaigned against the media, nearly trademarking 
the idea of “fake news.” He went a step beyond undermining other parties by challenging 
the establishment of the Republican Party under which he was running (Mudde, 2016).  
The body of literature that explains the shift of Obama to Trump as another rise of 
populism is prevalent. One of the strongest strains of this argument brands Trump’s 
populism to be  “racial-nationalist.” Scholars find this strain to be a constant theme 
throughout American history in response to times of crisis and articulated economic and 
cultural fears. Although most who subscribe to this idea recognize the differences 
between Trump and populists of the past, it is often written off as a slight adjustment to a 
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new period of time. However, scholars such as Mudde acknowledge that however many 
parallels are drawn, it is difficult to find an example of a populist that aligns exactly with 
Trump, noting that his amateurism is something that has never been observed before.  
Some believe that the Democrats may have come out on top had they turned to 
populism in the 2016 race. While reports from campaign insiders seemed to suggest they 
considered the path, they ultimately did not pursue it (Foer, 2017). Some academics 
believe Trump took this coveted populism position instead, and with it, seized the 
election. 
Russian Influence  
 Another theory that seeks to explain the election of Trump focuses on Russian 
interference in the 2016 election. This growing body of thought speculates that the 
Russian government influenced the election, in favor of Donald Trump, mainly through 
the creation and spreading of false news and propaganda throughout targeted areas in the 
U.S. The literature on this explanation tends to be more speculative, as new information 
is continually being released.  
The U.S. Intelligence community, specifically the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency, released a 
declassified document on January 6, 2017, detailing its assessment of Russian 
interference with the 2016 election. The document stated, “Vladimir Putin ordered an 
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election,” with the specific goal 
of harming Hillary Clinton’s “electability and potential presidency.” They continue, “We 
further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for 
President-elect Trump” (CIA,FBI,NSA, 2016).  
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A report published in The Atlantic (2017) analyzed the validity of the claim that 
the Russian government was fully responsible for the hack. The context proved to be 
notable; the hacking and propaganda occurred at the time Vladimir Putin explicitly 
blamed Clinton for “inciting protest against his rule” in her time as Secretary of State and 
as Trump stood as an especially pro-Russian candidate. Further, the Obama White House 
imposed sanctions against Russia on December 29, 2016, in light of cybercriminal 
activity. The FBI and Department of Homeland security released a statement on the same 
day, specifying, “This document provides technical details regarding the tools and 
infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military intelligence Services (RIS) to 
compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associated with the U.S. election.”  
The New York Times sought to uncover how the Russians conducted the hack and 
propaganda attack. One NYT report details Russia’s creation of fake social media 
accounts that were used to influence the election. These hundreds of fake accounts across 
Facebook and Twitter were filled with anti-Clinton rhetoric. As of 2017, Facebook 
officials have reported closing accounts that have been used to buy $100,000 worth of 
ads discussing prominent issues in the 2016 campaign. For example, on Election Day, 
Russian bots on Twitter sent out 1,700 #WarAgainstDemocrats messages. The New York 
Times report on Russian cyberpower highlights that, just like Watergate, this election 
scandal started with a break-in at the Democratic National Committee. Intelligence 
officials believe that Russian hackers began by gathering information from the D.N.C. 
and eventually, this information was instrumentally used in a campaign to shift the 
election in favor of Trump by harming candidate Clinton (Lipton, 2016).  
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This leaked information worked in tandem with the Russian bots created to spread 
unreliable and often verifiably false information about Clinton. Most of this information 
was spread through WikiLeaks. However, it might not have been solely WikiLeaks that 
served as the vessel for Russian information. America’s mainstream media often pushed 
these stories of Clinton’s emails and other sensitive D.N.C. emails and information. The 
stories of her personal emails and other scandals were often prioritized as the central 
news story, rather than reports of a Russian hack. Lipton (2017) asserts, “Every major 
publication, including The Times, published multiple stories citing the D.N.C. and 
Podesta emails posted by WikiLeaks, becoming a de facto instrument of Russian 
intelligence.” In this way, Putin and the Russian government used social media in tandem 
with America’s own mainstream media to push through damaging content about Clinton 
in order to influence the election.  
 Scholarship on this theory additionally points to collusion between the Trump 
campaign and Russian operatives as a major cause of the election results. A February 
2017 report in The Washington Post confirms, “members of the Trump campaign 
interacted with Russia at least 31 times throughout the campaign” (Kelly, 2017). A host 
of emails, meetings and other correspondence between Russian operatives and members 
of the Trump campaign have been uncovered, leading to a number of  indictments and 
clear evidence of some degree of collaboration (Kelly, 2017).  
Both Trump and Putin denied that the hacks and fake profiles were created by 
Russian intelligence groups, dismissing the accusation as a “stereotype of the nineties” 
and claiming there is no real proof from IP addresses. However, Andrei Soldatov, the 
author of Red Web, a book on the potential totalitarian nature of the Internet in Russia, 
	 20 
spoke to the Russian government’s ability to use its computer industry to hack its targets. 
“We have maybe the biggest engineer community in the world, and lots of great 
specialists. They are not criminals, they are professionals—and they are not bothered or 
afraid to refuse requests from government agencies.” (Gilsinan, 2017). 
 
Putin further denied the claim that Russia was behind these ads, arguing that there 
is no proof that any other IT specialist in the world did not create the bots. However, one 
of his top cyberintelligence advisers seemed to hint otherwise. In a speech in February of 
2015, the advisor referred to the eve of the first Soviet atomic bomb test, saying “We are 
living in 1948…I’m warning you: We are at the verge of having something in the 
information arena that will allow to us to talk to the Americans as equals” (Shane, 2017).  
While Russia has historically had a strained relationship with the United States, 
this is the first time post-Soviet Union and Cold War era that the United States could 
prove that Russia interfered with a U.S. election (Doran, 2017).  Although the former 
Soviet Union appears to have carried out campaigns with the intent of swaying elections, 
none have been as intrusive and influential as the one launched for the 2016 election. 
According to Gilsinan (2017), the federal government has not yet suggested that 
cyberattacks “managed to change the actual vote tally in favor of either presidential 
candidate.” However, there is growing speculation of the strong influence of Russian 
influence on the 2016 election results. This influence did not come in physical form, such 
as stealing ballots or keeping citizens away from voting booths. Rather, the Russian 
government dictated the agenda of discussion among Americans and mobilized especially 
conservative sects of America to vote by further villainizing Clinton and promoting 
Trump.   
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Democratic Party Failings and Clinton’s Gender  
 
A third theme of the literature addresses the failings of the Democratic Party as 
the main cause for the shift from Obama to Trump. Scholars contend the missteps of the 
Democrats caused Trump to be elected, as opposed to an insurmountable degree of 
popularity accumulated by the candidate himself. The literature that points to Democratic 
Party failings as the cause of the 2016 election of Trump generally subscribe to two 
different schools of thought: 1) Democrats failed to appeal to important cohorts of the 
electorate with their campaign strategy and messaging, and 2) Clinton was an unelectable 
candidate due to her gender and image.  
The Democrats failed to appeal to white working class voters. Most describe this 
failing as a result of both economic concerns about Democrats’ policies and a cultural 
war for which the Democrats were ill-prepared. Franklin Foer, former editor of The New 
Republic, wrote a piece in The Atlantic, titled “What’s Wrong With the Democrats.” Foer 
(2017) argues that the most crucial challenge Clinton and the Democrats had to overcome 
in the 2016 election was both to “celebrate multiculturism and at the same time to 
cushion against its backlash, which would inevitably come from white working class 
voters.” He believes that the Democrats failed to do this. Clinton aides echoed this 
sentiment in Shattered: Inside Hillary Clinton’s Doomed Campaign(2017), by Jonathan 
Allen and Amie Parnes, relaying that they failed to reach out to white voters starting with 
the early New Hampshire primary and never changed course.  
 While Clinton sought to emulate the Obama campaign in many ways, she failed to 
do so in this critical area. Obama’s team had conducted a campaign in the name of “One 
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America,” aimed at calming any anxiety over race of the candidate himself and tensions 
across the United States. Further, he targeted rural counties, even though it was evident to 
the campaign that he would not be able to carry them. While he did not win them, he 
“redirected populist anger” and “allayed cultural anxieties,” helping him to lose fewer 
crucial white non-college voters (Foer, 2017). On the other hand, Clinton only aimed to 
campaign in high-density urban areas, ignoring large sects of voters.  
 Academics believe this was a miscalculation of the Democrats. While the Clinton 
campaign believed it was a waste of time to win over what they saw as ideologically 
conservative or culturally stubborn voters, pollster Guy Molyneux finds evidence to the 
contrary. Through his Working America survey, he found that the white working class is 
not so far removed from the Democratic Party and that this cohort contains an important 
share of progressives and economically liberal citizens. He believes that this group is 
large enough the turn elections from Republican to Democratic—so long as the 
Democrats court to this constituency (Molyneux, 2016). In the 2016 election, this 
constituency was left largely untouched by the Clinton campaign (Prospect, 2017).  
 To worsen the situation, Clinton’s messaging did not seem to convey a clear or 
inclusive message. Slogans such as “I’m With Her” and “Breaking Down Barriers” only 
spoke to the historical nature of her run, and did nothing to woo white men, Foer writes. 
Finally, “Stronger Together” seemed to appeal to more of America, but the later part of 
the campaign seemed to only contrast Clinton from Trump, who never budged from 
“Make America Great Again” (Foer, 2017). While Clinton’s campaign seemed to push 
away white voters, Trump spoke directly to them—from his rhetoric to his campaign 
promises. This was evidenced by exit polls; a Pew Research Report found that “Trump’s 
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margin among whites without a college degree is the largest among any candidate in exit 
polls since 1980. Two-thirds (67%) of non-college whites backed Trump, compared with 
just 28% who supported Clinton, resulting in a 39-point advantage for Trump among this 
group.” New studies (Pew Research Center, 2018) demonstrate that these projected 
numbers of white working class voters are likely understated compared to the actual 
number that voted.  
An article by Guy Teixeira, John Halpin, and Robert Griffin points to the 
importance of the white working class, which was primed for political influence through 
their geographical distribution and their disproportional concentration in swing states. For 
example, in Rust Belt states the average swing Congressional district was “11 points 
more white working class than the average Congressional district and 16 points less 
minority” (Prospect, 2017). Trump swept many crucial states in the Midwest, areas where 
immigrant populations continue to wane, due to poor economic prospects (Prospect, 
2017). Foer (2017) echoes these concerns, stipulating that the electoral system tends to 
punish parties with support concentrated within and around cities.   
 Another branch of this theory takes this view a step farther and asserts that the 
Democrats failed to address not only the white working class, but also the working class 
as a whole, beyond just white voters. Thomas Edsall, a political journalism professor at 
Columbia University, subscribes to this theory. As the title of one of his articles “The 
Democratic Party Is in Worse Shape Than You Thought” (2016) suggests , he does not 
believe that the Democrats will easily win these constituencies back, as many view the 
leaders suspiciously and are unable to relate to them.  
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 Finally, scholars address gender as a major factor in the 2016 election. This is 
often written about under the theme of Clinton being an unelectable candidate. Generally, 
findings support that gender dynamics have been in effect in all US Presidential elections 
to date and the President’s office is “arguably the most masculine in American politics” 
(Dittmar, 2016, p. 807). Research on gender’s effect on the 2016 election finds that “the 
mere presence of a woman candidate [Clinton] could be sufficient to activate sexism.” 
(Braric et al. 2018, p. 5). Scholars describe similar effects on sexist voting patterns in 
American history (Dwyer et al. 2009; Paul and Smith 2008). 
 Analysis of Election Day exit poll surveys revealed that gender mattered in the 
2016 beyond just the identity category.  Both stereotypes about gender and fitness for 
office influenced candidate preferences (Braric et. al 2018, ). Further analysis finds, “a 
positive and significant relationship between sexism in the political realm and vote choice 
as well as favorability toward Trump.” This relationship was strongest among white 
voters  (Braric et al., 2018, p. 11). 
 Sexism played a role in voting preferences of both men and women. While male 
respondents are more likely to believe that men are better suited emotionally for politics 
than female respondents, (Bracric, 2018, p. 11), women who expressed high levels of 
agreement with the idea that men are better suited for politics are much more likely to 
vote for Trump (Bracric, 2018. p. 12).  
Scholars found this trend of sexism in voting likely resulted from gendered 
treatments by both opponents and the media (Dittmar, 2016 p. 807). Not only were voice, 
aggression and emotion discussed differently for women versus men but appearance was 
covered differently as well. Overall, the discussion of women was focused on “style over 
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substance” (Dittmar, 2016, p.809).  For example, Clinton was increasing critiqued on 
aspects of her femininity: “for her ‘masculine’ pantsuits, for how she carried herself, for 
how she didn’t smile enough, for how old she looked” (Reiheld, 2017, p.5). Overall, 
scholars found that sexism towards Clinton played a large role in the 2016 election and 
negatively impacted the perception and legitimacy of Clinton as a presidential candidate.  
White Status Anxiety and Voting  
A final theme in current literature is a focus on the role of race and white status 
anxiety among the white working class in the 2016 election. This discussion on racial 
tension has been present in scholarship throughout American history. It is important to 
contextualize these writings and discussions in order to fully understand the impact of 
race on the Trump election.  
Election results show that the white working class citizens voted for Donald 
Trump over Hillary Clinton by a margin of almost two to one (Green, 2017). White 
working class voters who voted for Trump seem to have views on immigration and race 
that go against core tenets of the Democrats’ philosophy. Foer (2017)  writes that race 
and class, prominent Democratic concerns, are becoming increasingly tense topics.  
Polling and focus groups conducted by Priorities USA found that those who 
switched to Trump were largely driven by powerful feelings on race and immigration. 
Trump was regarded to be masterful in forcing white working class voters to pick a side 
on a cultural war he gleefully created (Edsall, 2017). 
The explanation of white status anxiety as cause for the 2016 election results is 
particularly convincing due to the historical presence of this anxiety manifesting in 
nativism and white nationalism. Although white status anxiety has been a constant in 
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American history, it has taken on many different shapes and formed a myriad of in-
groups and out-groups. History demonstrates that nativism never disappears but rather 
dissipates and then re-emerges (Yang, 2017). White Americans have enjoyed this status 
since the formation of the working class and something that has become part of their 
identity.. This sense of whiteness and nativism encompass more than black Americans 
but now immigrants—Mexicans, Asians and Muslims more prominently. Writers such as 
David Roediger, Michelle Alexander and Arlie Hochschild have found racial anxiety 
through historical, quantitative and qualitative research 
For example, in Strangers In Their Own Land, Arlie Hochschild’s exploration of 
the contemporary American Right in rural areas, finds that the people who feel like the 
“strangers” are white: marginalized by demographic shifts, stagnant wages and a 
politically correct environment that seems to oppress their core beliefs and ideas. The 
“strangers” feel that blacks and immigrants are moving into this higher position of power 
and becoming the central targets of resources and support. A NYT review points out that 
while “Hochschild takes care not to call anyone racist” she concludes that “race is an 
essential part of this story” (DeParle, 2016). 
More white working class citizens—a group that accounts for one-third of the 
American electorate (Green, 2017)—turned out to vote because they had not been asked 
to vote by any recent politician other than Trump. Theory by Rosenstone and Hansen 
(1993) suggests that people do not vote for three main reasons: they are unable to due to 
voting laws, they do not feel motivated to do so or they feel a detachment from the parties 
and candidates—as if no one asked them to vote (p. 217). However, it can only be 
assumed that different people voted in the 2016 election. It will never be know exactly 
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what person voted for whom. For this reason, this theory remains an assumption based on 
facts, but not a fact itself.   
Census data showed that a record number of Americans voted in the 2016 
presidential election to the tune of 137.5 million. The voter turnout percentage fell just 
below the 63.6% who voted in the 2008 election. However, it appears that different 
people voted in this election. Black voter turnout fell, white voter turnout increased and 
the non-white electorate remained stagnant in 2016. While voter turnouts across all 
women remained stagnant, white women voters increased their turnout rate in 2016 
(Krogstad and Lopez, 2017). Education has also played a more and more important role 
in party identification, as college graduates become more likely to identify as Democrats 
and those without a college degree become more likely to identify as Republicans 
(Dimock, 2017).  Further, a collection of groups from Pew Research, to Fox News, to the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, found that exit polls overestimated the 
support of Trump by well-educated white voters and “severely underrepresented” older 
white voters without a college degree, especially older ones (Cohn, 2018).This means 
even a greater number of white working class voters turned out than even initially 
understood.   
Due to a frustration of being “cut in line” by minority groups (Hoschchild, 2013), 
it seems the white working class came out in droves to support the only candidate 
seemingly willing to protect their historically privileged status. This status was created 
and maintained through institutions including Jim Crow and the judicial system. 
Historical Context of Nationalism, Nativism and Racial Rhetoric  
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The following section will review how scholarship has discussed nativism, 
nationalism and race in key periods of American history. Finally, it will review the role 
of race in the 2016 election. In order to fully understand the role of racial anxiety, this 
section will address nationalistic and nativist policy as well as trends of racial rhetoric.  
Nativism and nationalism often surge in response to new racial dynamics, such as a large 
influx of immigrants, or changing roles of minorities in America.   
Creation of White Status (1600s) and Formation of the White Working Class  
As early as 1676, American policy discriminated against racial out-groups. Events 
such as Bacon’s Rebellion hastened the systematic oppression of African-Americans in 
order to drive a wedge between a powerful alliance of poor whites and slaves and 
indentured servants. In response to a potential alliance, the planter class granted poor 
whites special privileges that were not extended to blacks. For example, whites were 
allowed to police slaves through slave patrols and were given greater access to Native 
American lands. Further, they created barriers that removed the competition between free 
labor and slave labor. By creating this system of privilege, whites did not necessarily 
have a better economic position, but they were situated in a better place than slaves and 
indentured servants (Alexander, 2011, p. 25).  
“White worker” became a “self-conscious social category” that was used to 
distinguish and compare to black people in America. The chicken or the egg debate is 
often evoked among historians in deciding if this development began before or after 
slavery (Roediger, 2007, pg. 23). Either way, white free-labor workers and black slaves 
became highly distinguished categories from the onset of American history.  
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Another important part of the formation of working class “whiteness” developed 
at the start of the 19th century. David Roediger argues that the systematic formation of the 
white working class and a strong sense of whiteness went hand in hand (2007, pg. 7). 
Following Reconstruction, when African-Americans started to gain economic and 
political power, the Jim Crow system emerged. Once again, the effort was driven by 
white elites in a move to eliminate an alliance of poor people of all races. The 
discriminatory barriers created allowed poor whites to retain a sense of superiority over 
African-Americans and redirected their hostilities from the elite class to black citizens 
(Alexander, 2011, p. 34). Alexander calls these “racial bribes” and finds them to be 
primarily psychological, as the economic situations of poor whites remained largely the 
same.  
Nativist Groups Emerge (1800s)  
   
Social and political groups with nativist undertones emerged starting in the 1800s. 
These groups have parallels to similar entities today, including misconceptions that 
immigrants are a danger to U.S. native-born citizens, fear that immigration threatens 
American workers, and a disdain for racial out-groups.  
One of the first nativist groups was the Know-Nothing Party, formed by members 
in the working class who were anti-Catholic and anti-Irish (Boisonneault 2017). They 
adopted a political and social philosophy of “Americanism,” which focused on the 
principle of “nationality” and upholding this in all instances (Ward, 2014). The party 
supported policies including deportation of foreign beggars and criminals. At the time, 
these policies were targeted to the influx of German and Irish immigrants who came to 
America in response to the potato famine. In the 1850s, the Know-Nothing party included 
	 30 
eight governors, more than 100 congressmen, a controlling share of legislatures and 
thousands of additional local politicians. In the beginning, the party was a secret society, 
until the thoughts became popular enough to move into the public eye as a political party 
(Boissoneault, 2017, pg. 2-3).  
In the 1800s, Chinese immigrants also became a target of nativism. They were 
labeled as an “unassimilable, even subversive group, [whose] vicious customs and habits 
were a social menace” (Jones 1960) likely due to their new presence in America. This 
attitude towards Chinese immigrants manifested in a series of legislation passed starting 
in the late 1800’s.  The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended immigration of 
Chinese laborers for 10 years, and was renewed periodically until 1943. In 1887, the 
Scott Act did not allow any Chinese individuals to re-enter the country upon departure, 
even if they were citizens or legal residents. Lastly, the Exclusion Act required all 
Chinese individuals have certificates that detailed their eligibility to live and work in the 
United States (Young, 2016).  
Oppression of Immigrants (1900s)  
 In the 1900s, around 70 percent of immigrants arrived from regions in Eastern 
Europe and Russia. Many of these new immigrants were Jewish and were unwelcomed 
by both the American working class and elites. They were stereotyped as greedy and 
many believed they were taking away work from American-born citizens. This hostility 
towards Jewish immigrants resulted in anti-Semitic protests by populist groups such as 
the Knights of Labor (Garis, 1927; Curran, 1975).   
White nationalism was also apparent in this period, as the Ku Klux Klan sought to 
oppress African-Americans, along with other minority groups (Kazin, 2016). The Ku 
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Klux Klan, a notorious hate-group formed in the Reconstruction-era South, was on the 
rise in the 1920s. Although it had been previously shut down by the federal government, 
a second installment was assembled starting in 1915, and attracted Americans across the 
nation. This group sought to take away rights of African Americans, particularly equal 
protection under the law and the right to vote (Kazin, 2016). The KKK also sought to 
undermine the rights of some European immigrants, previously targeted by populist 
groups. With the power of five million members, they lobbied Congress to pass quotas in 
1924 that limited immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe to be only few hundred 
per nation, a system that remained in place for four decades (Kazin, 2016; Howland, 
1929, pg. 444). This legislation, among others driven by fear of immigrants, caused the 
number of foreign-born immigrants to sharply decline for many years after the 1920s 
(Young, 2017).  
In the 1930s, Filipinos were the next immigrant group to face hostility in 
America. Nativists portrayed them as “immoral, criminal and unassimilable.” The 
Philippine Independence Act of 1934 limited Philippine immigration to only 50 a year 
(Jones, 1960). This quota, in tandem with that of the Chinese Exclusion Act, limited 
Asian immigration to the United States almost completely for decades to come.  
While the government created legislation to keep some immigrant groups from 
entering the U.S., Mexican immigrants were directly ushered in by the U.S. federal 
government in the 1940s as a result of economic pressures. With the outbreak of World 
War II in 1941, there was a shortage of agricultural workers. In order to fill this gap in 
agrarian economies, a temporary agreement with Mexico was made in 1942 to allow 
Mexican farm workers, “braceros,” to start entering the United States. Congress extended 
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the program well into the 1940s as farmers outsourced their work to unauthorized 
workers from Mexico in an effort to keep up with a demanding economy. Public Law 78 
then made the bracero program permanent and this fixture remained through the 1950s 
(Ward, 2014, p. 12).   
 However, Mexican immigrants faced hostility in America. Conditions in the 
1950s brought on a tidal wave of fear; with a minor recession and anti-communist 
sentiment the public cry was directed towards border concerns (Ward, 2014, p. 12). 
However, even as the public demanded greater border security as an answer to concerns 
of their own safety and job security, there was still a need and desire for cheap labor from 
Mexico. In response to this conundrum, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) created “Operation Wetback.” This operation intended to create an image of 
strength and intimidation around border concerns: militarization around the U.S./ Mexico 
border was increased. However, to keep up with labor demands, the INS was 
simultaneously doubling bracero visas. The situation often played out in a nearly satirical 
fashion; the INS would raid fields and bring unauthorized immigrants back to the border 
only to register them as braceros so they could continue working on U.S. farms (Ward, 
2016, p. 13).  
The advent of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s created a different racial 
dynamic and also effectively ended the bracero program. Explicit and hostile racial 
rhetoric was rejected publically. Racial messages did not disappear, but rather shifted to 
be more subtle and implicit (Valentino, 2017, pg. 5) Additionally, for all the animosity 
and contempt Americans held towards Mexican immigrants, the U.S. had developed a 
dependency on immigrant workers. In effect, the U.S. was “paradoxically locked into a 
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relationship that would become one of the public’s greatest fears” (Ward, 2014, p.14).  
While the U.S. remained dependent on labor from Mexican immigrants, public sentiment 
towards this group remained hostile. 
Between 1970 and 1980, the U.S. economy struggled. For parts of the 1970s, 
America experienced a recession; the unemployment rate rose to 50%, median income 
decreased while income inequality rose and the value of the dollar plummeted (Ward, 
2014).  In 1973, oil prices shot up due to the Arab oil embargo, prolonging the recession 
(Ward, 2014). Further, the Cold War was still raging on. The U.S., following historical 
precedents, needed a scapegoat: immigrants. Border security was framed as a “matter of 
national security” and was continually linked to the Cold War, the threat of foreign 
terrorism and violence associated with drug importation and usage. The approach to 
border security shifted to be more cautious and distanced, with violence taking a back 
seat to working with local law enforcement to patrol, observe and report (Doty, 2009).  
 As border security increased, many Americans interpreted this as a symbol that 
immigration should be severely decreased. Between 1984 and 1993, the percent of 
Americans supporting limitations to immigration went from 33% to 62% and the percent 
specifically believing Hispanic immigration was far too high grew from 53% to 62% 
(Jones, 2006). However, while anti-immigration was still linked to deep-rooted neo-
vigilantism in the United States (Ward, 2014, p.7), it also became a far more acceptable 
and mainstream sentiment. Policy actors first set the stage for fear of immigration by 
framing immigration as a threat to American job security and way of life and then 
increasing border security. Combined with intense public response, the road for anti-
immigration mobilization was paved (Burstien, 2003). 
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Racial Resentment and Rhetoric (1900s)  
As anti-immigration sentiment was growing, anti-black resentment seemed to be 
surfacing again as well. Following the Civil Rights movement, some whites responded to 
blacks’ elevated position in society with discomfort, anxiety and anger. One way this 
sentiment manifested was the high frequency of racial language in Nixon’s 1972 election. 
His campaign appealed to whites’ racial resentment. For example, on a televised 
addressed in 1969, Nixon called white Americans who were disgruntled by “racial 
liberalism” the “Silent Majority.” This was an attempt to capture votes of unaligned 
Democrats who felt “unjustly neglected” and angered that they were “paying the price for 
past discrimination against blacks (Peretz, 2014, pg. 10). This resentment shifted from an 
old-style racism that was centered around the biological superiority of white Americans 
to black and shifted to resentment based on “traditional American values” that blacks 
were accused of betraying (Kinder, 1996, pg. 13). Nixon capitalized on these sentiments 
in his campaign, cracking down on ‘welfare policy’ and being ‘tough on crime.’  
Minorities as Scapegoats (1980s-1990s)  
 At the start of the 1980s the response against immigration seemed to be growing  
stronger (Conover, 1997). However, in 1986, the U.S. government once again worked 
with the Mexican government to further economic interests. They wanted to unite 
American and Mexican markets but excluded the integration of labor. The Immigration 
Control and Reform Act emerged to satiate popular concerns over Mexican immigration; 
this signaled that the American electorate remained in support of this kind of restrictionist 
policy (Ward, 2014).  
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These policies—from border security to immigration law—were often more 
symbolic than functional. They were driven by fear over more integration with Mexico, 
ironically a result of trade policies by the U.S. government. Due to public insecurities, it 
became a politically intelligent move to strongly support immigration policy into 
prominence. They used immigrants as scapegoats to satiate public fear around broader 
social and economic changes (Ward, 2014, p. 26).  
 In 1990, the Immigration Act was passed to crack down on border crossing and 
serve as a symbol of America’s “anti-immigration backlash.” In 1998, half of states 
passed laws to make English the official language of the state, with the intention of 
sending a message to immigrants. This interaction of political actors and the public 
framed the border and immigration as a crisis, creating a climate of fear.  
 In the 1990s political communication cued Americans to believe that not only 
immigrants were a threat, but fellow American citizens as well. Crime news that featured 
black perpetrators increased the potency of racial animosity as a predictor of “harsh 
criminal justice policy support compared to those exposed to no such story” (Peffley et 
al. 1997; Valentino 1999; Domke 2001). Further, language that included words like 
“inner city” found similar results (Hurwitx 2005). Images in campaign advertising of 
black Americans were paired with narratives that detailed “wasteful government 
spending” and caused strong shifts in racial attitudes (Valentino, 2002, p. 8). Lastly, news 
outlets consistently covered stories and images of black Americans in policy, leading the 
public to believe a far greater proportion of welfare recipients were black than was the 
case (Gilens, 1996).  
Racial Out-Groups (2000s)  
	 36 
The early 2000s ushered in more racial hostility—targeted towards Hispanic 
immigrants and Muslims in America. The “Latino Threat Narrative” continued into the 
2000s, with characterizations, images and comments that collectively created a negative 
image of Hispanic immigrants and portrayed them as a security threat. This narrative was 
particularly persuasive and helped grow the anti-immigration movement (Ward, 2014, p. 
26).  
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack by al-Queda extremists created a climate 
of fear and embedded anti-immigration fears into the American public’s psyche (Ward, 
2014, p. 20).  The attack not only refined already established practices against 
immigration but created another out-group that became a central target of the Trump 
campaign: Muslims.   
Race and White Status Anxiety’s Impact on the Election (2016)  
Trump took advantage of existing racial anxiety around minorities, primarily 
black people and Hispanic and Muslim immigrants. His appeals to nativist and nationalist 
sentiments were particularly undressed and highly public (Green, 2017).  
Trump won white, non-college-educated voters by a larger margin than any 
presidential candidate since 1980, according to a report by the Pew Research Center. It is 
evident that anxiety around white status predominately affected the white working class.  
This is demonstrated through research done before and after the 2016 election. For 
example, national surveys, including ones conducted by Brookings and The Atlantic 
(2017), found major differences in responses surrounding cultural anxiety among the 
college educated white Americans and white working-class Americans, and a huge 
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disparity between the attitude of the white-working class and the rest of the American 
population.  
National surveys found that cultural anxiety was a stronger driver of support for 
Trump than economic concerns. Reports in 2017 found that fear of cultural displacement, 
defined as white working class Americans who feel like “strangers in their own land,” 
pushed the white working class to Trump (The Atlantic and PRRI on Immigration, 2017).  
Overall, these surveys found that cultural issues were the strongest predictors of support 
for Trump, more so than economic factors. While “economic fatalism” was a factor in 
support for Trump, “economic hardship” was identified as a factor in support for Clinton.  
Studies such as Brookings and PRRI on Immigration in 2016, reported that the 
strongest predictor of a vote for Trump was anxiety over cultural change. Of white 
working class voters, 68% said the “American way of life needs to be protected from 
foreign influence” and half agreed with the sentiment that “things have changed so much 
that I often feel like a stranger in my own country.” Of people with these opinions, 79% 
voted for Trump.  A PPRI survey found that while only 27% of white working class 
voters said they “favor a policy of identifying and deporting immigrants who are in the 
country illegally,” 87% of people who held this belief voted for Trump. Survey results 
show that some concern with immigration is related to economic concerns, whether this 
view is founded or not. Eight in ten Trump supporters agreed that “immigrants constitute 
a burden on America” because they take jobs, housing, and healthcare (PRRI on 
Immigration, 2017).  In contrast, less than three in ten registered Democrats hold this 
belief. A study by Justin Gest in 2012 found that 65% of white Americans would 
consider supporting a party that stood for “stopping mass immigration, providing 
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American jobs to American workers, preserving America’s Christian heritage, and 
stopping the threat of Islam” (Kazin, 2012). 
Tensions around racial bias were also highlighted as drivers of a Trump vote. Around 
43% of white college-educated Americans and 66% of white working-class Americans 
agreed, “discrimination against whites is as big a problem today as discrimination against 
blacks and other minorities.” This belief is not shared with other Americans: only 38% of 
Hispanic Americans and 29% of black Americans held this opinion. Other national 
studies reported similar findings, reporting that a majority of white working class 
Americans (52%) believed discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as 
discrimination against minorities (Cox, 2017).  
Survey data reveals that many white working-class Americans believe the U.S. is in 
decline—nearly two-thirds responded that American culture has gotten worse since the 
1950s (Green, 2017) and a majority of white Americans (55%) and white-working class 
Americans (62%) think specifically culture and society has changed for the worse since 
1950 (Jones, 2016). In contrast, majorities of Hispanic (54%) and black Americans (71%) 
say things have changed for the better since the 1950 (Jones, 2016). 
 Arlie Hochschild (2016) explored the psychographics of white working class 
Americans through in-depth interviews across rural America in attempt to explain the 
type of attitudes apparent in these national studies. She explained the racial anxiety of 
these citizens as a response to a perception that they were being “cut in line” by 
minorities, urbanites and foreigners. Often, people’s perception was that the government 
was not looking out for them and was unconcerned about their plight as hard-working 
white Americans without college degrees. Further, this cohort of Americans felt 
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community among each other, yet estranged from other parts of America, leading them to 
look inward and reiterate negative attitudes towards career politicians, immigrants and 
mainstream media, just to name a few. This thinking is reiterated by their majority-white 
communities. Opinions about those outside of their community—the line cutters—
become further rooted and exaggerated in the minds of community members due to the 
phenomenon of group-think that is not often challenged by outside perspectives.  
Kaiser (2017) reiterates this sentiment of shared community among white 
Americans living in rural communities. “The sense of shared identity that connects many 
rural Americans—which factors into rural America’s sense of fairness and 
estrangement—is less intense among rural minorities than among rural whites.”  While 
78% of white rural residents say other rural residents share their values, that falls to 64% 
among Hispanics and to 55% of black residents (Cox, 2017).  
 Paul Manuel writes a similar assessment of the Trump election. Trump’s anti-
political-correctness and racially charged campaign appealed to those who felt threated 
by changing demographics and progressive political climates in America. This new world 
seemed to reward immigration, minorities, women in politics, and gay/lesbian and 
transgender citizens above white, heterosexual men. Trump’s campaign rhetoric that 
referred to the American past being better than today appealed to those, primarily in the 
white-working class (67%), who believed America was better in the 1950s than it is 
today (Jones, 2016). These citizens are opposed to liberal policies and feel threatened by 
the generational change taking place (Manuel, 2017).  
Another element of Trump’s campaign, to “Make America Safe Again,” spoke to 
Americans who had anxiety over the threat of terrorism. Surveys, such as PRRI and 
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Brookings, report data that shows that white-working class Americans would have 
connected more to this slogan. This cohort is more likely to support a ban on Muslim 
immigration (54%).   
A partner at Global Strategies, Nick Gourevitch, also attempted to address 
components of cultural anxieties and how they drove support for Trump. Gourevitch 
writes that economics and culture are intertwined, and the Obama to Trump shift 
occurred in areas that are less economically vibrant than they used to be (Edsall, 2016)—
and it seems to be that people are blaming this on foreigners and minorities. While 
Gourevitch uses the world ‘culture’ as a description, my analysis finds that ‘race’ would 
more clearly communicate the anxiety the communities he described experienced.   
White Status Anxiety the 2016: the Economy is Not the Main Driver  
The economy is often discussed as the cause of this shift in white-working class 
voters. While it certainly played a role in the shift, some literature finds the economy was 
not as strong of a driver as white status anxiety. The perception that black and minority 
populations are doing “better” than white Americans is provably false based on a number 
of quantitative measurements. The income gap between black and white working-class 
Americans is just as extreme as it was five decades ago. This holds true across every 
income level. The gap between Hispanic and white Americans mirrors the black and 
white income gap. To be specific, “black households at the 20th and 40th percentiles of 
household income earned an average of 55% as much as white households at those same 
percentiles. This is exactly the same figure as in 1967” (Campos, 2017). For context, in 
the mid-sixties, Jim Crow was still being disassembled. Black household income has not 
approached that of whites since then.  
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 Qualitative assessments also point that concerns over white status drove more 
voters out on Election Day than economic grievances. One aspect of white status anxiety 
is immigration. An article published by Pew Research Center reports that while economic 
factors often play the greatest role in U.S. presidential elections, in the 2016 election, it 
was foreign policy. It specifies, “the public now sees national security concerns, not 
economic issues, as the most significant challenge facing the nation in this election year” 
(Stokes, 2016). Pew Research Center data supports this claim. In December 2012, when 
Obama was elected, 55% of Americans listed economic concerns—including 
unemployment, inequality and poverty—as the most important problems in the U.S. Only 
six percent cited foreign policy as the main problem. In December 2014, only three 
percent more cited foreign policy as a main concern. However, in December of 2015, 
32% cited international issues/foreign policy as the biggest challenge the U.S. was facing, 
with terrorism being the largest concern, while only 23% referenced economic issues—a 
complete reversal (Pew Research Center ISIS and Terrorism, 2015).  
Anxiety over immigrants taking jobs and hurting the economy are not factually-
based. A report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 
(2016), examined the demographic and economic effects of immigration in the United 
States over the past 20 years and found that there is “little evidence that immigration 
significantly affects the overall employment levels of native born workers” and that 
“immigration has an overall positive impact on long run economic growth in the U.S.” 
The report concludes that where small negative wage effects are observed on American 
workers, it is often prior immigrants that are more prone to them, followed by native born 
high-school drop-outs.  
	 42 
White Status Anxiety and Voting  
 Votes for Trump were highest in “very white suburbs,” roughly defined as 85 
percent white or greater. These areas are concentrated in the Midwest and Northeast: 
areas where Trump’s vote increased tremendously above that of Mitt Romney (Edsall, 
2017). On the other hand, Trump’s vote did not increase in racially diverse suburbs, 
especially those that had been diverse for over a decade (Edsall, 2017). As discussed 
above, Trump’s messages resonated the most among white, working class Americans—
particularly those in the whitest and most racially isolated communities.  
Figure 2.1: GOP Vote Share Change, 2012-2016 – Major Metros, PA, MI, WI, OH  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Edsall, 2017  
A paper by Edsall explains that cultural anxiety was the strongest in areas 
experiencing small signs of minority growth but that had not experienced true diversity 
for any notable amount of time. Areas with the strongest racial anxiety experienced the 
strongest support for Trump, in both the general and primary elections. This strong 
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support may have mobilized different types of citizens to come out to the polls than 
before, particularly ones not often active in civic engagement.  
The graphic above shows the four Rust Belt states key to Trump’s victory and the 
strong outpouring of support from “very white” districts.  The demographic shows the 
areas where Trump’s margin hits its highest points—municipalities with 85% white 
populations or greater. Areas where this majority exists include urban fringe, rural areas, 
and second ring suburbs. Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania carry some of the 
highest density of ultra-white communities, and they are the very areas that carried 
Trump to an electoral victory (Edsall, 2017). Data has shown that white, working-class 
voters, the majority of the population in these areas, had the strongest anxiety regarding 
immigration and racism against whites. These populations are simultaneously the ones 
most insulated from the “threats” they cite as the most concerning to them.  
 It is possible that these anxieties would not rise to the level they did had the white 
working-class been living in integrated communities. A report by Orfield (2013) finds 
that in integrated communities, whites and nonwhites have the most positive perceptions 
of one another. However, fewer white Americans are living in integrated areas, and many 
communities that were once integrated have now re-segregated. Of the neighborhoods 
that were integrated in 1980, most became primary nonwhite by 2010. As of 2010, 39% 
of suburban residents live in predominately white communities, and while this number is 
decreasing—this number was 51% in 2000—it is still surprisingly high (Orfield, 2013).  
 The PRRI/Brookings 2016 Immigration Survey found that “Americans who live 
in communities with a high number of immigrants are more likely than those who do not 
to view the economic contributions of illegal immigrants positively.” Of Americans who 
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live in communities with high numbers of recent immigrants, 49% say that the low-cost 
labor provided by illegal immigrants help the economy, and only 40% believe they drive 
down wages. However, Americans in areas with nearly no new immigrants—these 
majority white communities—are far more likely to answer that immigrants hurt the 
economy, with 61% believing they drive down wages and only 32% holding the opinion 
that low-cost labor is beneficial (Green, 2017). 
Racial Politics and Rhetorical Change  
 Racial rhetoric shifted after the 2008 election of Obama to be more explicit, 
signaling a shift in white anxiety. A research paper, The Changing Norms of Racial 
Political Rhetoric and the End of Racial Priming, finds that citizens “recognize racially 
hostile content in political communications, but are no longer angered or disturbed by it” 
(Valentino, 2017, p. 3) regardless of implicit or explicit nature. After the election of 
America’s first black president, logic ensued that suggested that if a black man can be 
president, America must have a post-racial society and therefore policies that “balanced 
the playing field” actually work to disadvantage whites in America, particularly non-
college educated whites (Valentino, 2017, p. 5). Explicitly hostile rhetoric towards 
minorities arose out of this conception.  
 The explicit racial messaging could be seen directly following Obama’s election, 
from posters depicting Michelle and Barack Obama as apes, to the n-word appearing 
more frequently at Tea Party rallies. For example, a leader of the Tea Party, Mark 
Williams, published a letter to the editor, referring to the NAACP as a racist organization 
“dedicated to unfairly redistributing white wealth to ‘lazy’ blacks’ (LA Times, 2010).  
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 Over the last few election cycles, this strong white identity has grown 
tremendously as demographic shifts led whites to believe their position in society was 
threatened. (Knowles and Peng, 2005). Increases in “entitativity” have also been 
detected—“the perception that one belongs to a coherent and unified collective.” 
Entitativity makes explicit expressions of outgroup stereotypes and discrimination more 
acceptable (Effron and Knowles, 2015).  
 This out-group hostility reverses a historical trend of more subtle racial messaging 
post Civil Rights (Mendelberg, 2001). As this hostility becomes more explicit and even 
acceptable, polarization over these issues and the potential for conflict grow (Valentino, 
2017), as well as the possibility for polarizing figures, such as Donald Trump, to be 
elected president.  
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES  
 
 In order to understand the underlying causes that shifted white working-class 
voters from Barack Obama to Donald Trump, I conduct three case studies in counties that 
voted for Obama in 2008 and 2012 and then voted for Trump in 2016. Case studies 
offered the best opportunity to explore opinions and trends that are nearly impossible to 
capture through statistical measures and numeric assessments.  
The three counties chosen represent three different areas of the country, with an 
emphasis on the Midwest: Macomb County in Michigan, Cedar County in Iowa and 
Granville County in North Carolina. All three counties have majority white populations 
and are solidly “middle-class.”  These case studies serve as mechanisms for a deeper, 
more concentrated understanding of shifts, attitudes and other environmental factors that 
may have occurred each county. I analyze each of these cases alongside patterns of 
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nativism and nationalism in American history in order to extrapolate trends at the county 
level to the results of the national election.  
 I selected Macomb County due to its relevance to the history of shifts in majority 
support. After Ronald Reagan was elected in 1984, Stanley Greenberg, a researcher for 
Democracy Corps, conducted focus groups and research on “Reagan Democrats” in 
1985. He conducted similar research again in 2008, prior to Macomb voting for the first 
African American president. Macomb switched again in this election, voting for Trump 
and likely delivering him the margin necessary to carry Michigan (Greenberg, 2018). 
Macomb is majority white (81.90%) and has a large working class, with a median 
household income across the county of $55,951.  
 Cedar County’s vote has reflected the winner of every presidential election since 
1992, historically moving with national shifts in majority support. Cedar County, Iowa is 
97.40% white, has a large number of rural areas and has a strong representation of the 
working class with a median income of $60,435 as of 2016.   
 Granville County, North Carolina, selected to represent the South, is composed of 
64.4% white citizens, 32.20% black citizens, and 7.8% Latino citizens. The median 
income is $50, 217 as of 2016 (U.S. Census, 2016). Granville sits in the “swing state” of 
North Carolina.  
Within each case study, I concentrated on three main categories of data. These 
include population and demographic trends, economic trends and rhetoric and cultural 
trends. In order to analyze each case study, I used a mixed methods approach. I began by 
evaluating secondary data for each category. For population and demographics, I largely 
used the U.S. Census data on economics and demographics and related sources such as 
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Policy Map and Social Explorer. I also examined election data provided by states, 
counties and precincts to observe how demographic groups and populations voted. To 
examine economic trends, I used U.S. Census data as well as the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, among other sources.  
To support this analysis of trends, I conducted original research to obtain primary 
data. For each county, I conducted in-depth phone interviews with public officials in 
Macomb, Cedar and Granville counties. I contacted these public officials through public 
emails found on government websites or through clerk’s offices. After I requested in-
depth interviews, I spoke to any public official willing to take the interview. I interviewed 
12 public officials in Granville County, 6 in Cedar County and 4 in Macomb County. 
During these interviews, I asked about shifts and trends in all relevant areas including 
demographic, economic, environmental, political, cultural and racial trends. My 
interviews were semi-structured in order to allow for insights, observations and opinions 
of public officials (see Appendix 1A). This qualitative data was used to identify trends in 
conjunction with quantitative data from secondary sources and historical data from peer-
reviewed journals and other publications.  
 In my results section, I briefly discuss findings from each case study and 
summarize trends for each county. Then, I analyze the trends across all three counties in 
conjunction with historical trends, as well as other studies, to reach a conclusion and 
derive policy implications.  
CHAPTER 4:  CASE STUDY RESULTS 
I. Characteristics of Macomb County  
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Macomb County is one of the most studied cases on shifts in majority support. In 1985, 
Stanley Greenberg was sent on behalf of Democracy Corps to understand the so-called 
“Reagan Democrats” and their motivations and attitudes behind voting against the 
Democratic Party. Democracy Corps studied Macomb again in 2008 before voters there 
elected Barack Obama. After Macomb County went for Trump, it was viewed nationally  
Figure 4.1: Macomb County Reference Map  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Macomb County Reference Map, Data Driven Detroit, 2013 
as a symbol of political realignment. Timothy Bledsoe, a political science professor at 
Wayne State University speculated, “My suspicion is that what happened in Macomb is 
the same as what happened especially across the upper Midwest; there was kind of a 
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revolt of working class whites ... who’d been part of the Democratic coalition for years” 
(Burns, 2016). Greenberg visited Macomb again in 2017 to conduct focus groups with 35 
participants, funded by Democracy Corps and the Reagan Institute, in an effort to 
understand the shift back away from the Democratic Party. Greenberg’s research in 
Macomb from 1985 to 2017 served as supporting research in Macomb County and a 
guide to my primary and secondary research of all three counties.  
 Macomb County, in the suburbs north of Detroit, has grown 9.08% over the past 
16 years, largely driven by black, Asian and Hispanic populations.  Notably, Macomb has 
become the home to a large Chaldean refugee population over the past 5 years. The 
county has aged over the years and although it skews to the older demographic, 62% of 
the population remains working age. Its population density was 1,794 per square mile in 
2016 and is forecasted to continue growing (Open Data Network, 2016).   
As of 2016, the median income in Macomb is  $54,640, slightly less than the U.S. 
median income of $55,775. Macomb has been consistently middle class, leaning towards 
lower instead of upper brackets. Manufacturing has traditionally dominated the economy, 
but has seen a slight decrease since the time of the recession, with healthcare and social 
assistance creating more jobs. While the unemployment rate has remained low and even 
decreased since 2007, the poverty rate has slightly increased, especially for white citizens 
in Macomb. While a far greater percentage of black people in Macomb are impoverished, 
a greater number of white people are in poverty and this number is trending slightly 
upwards. Relevant cultural themes in Macomb include 1) a frustrated white, working and 
middle class, 2) struggles with identity politics and 3) little-to-no interaction with federal 
government policy.  
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II. Characteristics of Cedar County  
Figure 4.2 Cedar County Iowa Reference Map  
SOURCE: Cedar County Iowa, Google Maps, 2018 
Cedar County sits on the east side of Iowa and is a small rural county with a 
population density of 32 per square mile as of 2016. Its population growth has remained 
relatively stagnant (Open Data Network, 2016). It is overwhelmingly white (97.08%) 
with a slightly increasing growth of minorities including black, Asian and Hispanic 
populations and a miniscule number of immigrants. Cedar is an aging county, with 
18.21% of its population being 65 and older. Nearly 60% are working age (18-64).  
Cedar’s economy is dominated by Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, 
Management of Companies and Enterprises and Manufacturing. In particular, 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting employs 4.86 times more people than what 
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would be expected in a location the size of Cedar. The median household income in 
Cedar is $59,047—slightly above that of the U.S. The population is staunchly middle 
class with a majority of households making from $35,000 to $99,000. Six percent of the 
county is in poverty, a steady trend that has affected all races in Cedar. Manufacturing, 
Health Care and Social Assistance and Retail Trade provide the greatest number of jobs 
in Cedar. The unemployment rate has consistently remained low, with some fluctuation 
in industry employment as the economy diversified when agriculture shifted to play a 
smaller role in the economy. Relevant cultural trends include 1) greater interaction with 
local governments than federal, 2) reinvigorated conservatism and 3) fear of change.  
III. Characteristics of Granville County  
Figure 4.2 Granville County Reference Map  
 
SOURCE: NCSU Library GIS data, 2018 
Granville County is located north of 
Wake County and the state capital of 
Raleigh. The northern end of the county sits 
on the North Carolina-Virginia border.  
Granville represents a mid-size county—
smaller than Macomb but larger than Cedar. 
It has a population density of 110 per square 
mile as of 2016 (Open Data Network, 2016). 
This number has increased 20.3% since 2000, but growth has slowed since around 2010. 
Granville is majority white but more diverse than other counties studied. The county has 
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a large African-American population, and over the past eight years, a large growth in the 
Hispanic population. Granville is aging, but has a large working population.  
Granville borders the nearby counties of Vance, Warren and Gates and is 
essentially composed of two distinctive parts, north and south. Officials describe the 
county as being divided by the Tar River. The Northern part of the county includes towns 
like Oakhill, Oxford and Stovall and is far more rural and agrarian, with more of an aging 
demographic. This part of Granville is “underdeveloped” and far less dense. The 
Southern part is closer to the Research Triangle Park and to the cities of Raleigh, Durham 
and Chapel Hill. Due to this proximity, it has become a bedroom community for younger 
professionals working in these areas—from RTP to Duke to Hospital Systems. This part 
of the county is generally wealthier, younger, and socially disconnected from the county. 
Towns in this part of the county include Creedmoor, Butner and Stem.  
 Officials described this divide originating with power systems and phone utilities 
stopping at the Tar River, so residents had different energy suppliers and phone providers 
based on which side of the river they lived on. These distinctions created a north/south 
divide and reinforced sentiments of difference that grew over time, with the north being 
“extremely more rural “and the South more urbanized and increasingly becoming a 
bedroom community for those working in larger cities. Officials say the divide still stands 
due to the long history in rural communities, even if infrastructure systems have become 
more blended.  
The Granville economy is specialized in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, 
Public Administration and Manufacturing. The largest industries in Granville are 
Healthcare and Social Assistance, Manufacturing and Retail Trade. The median income 
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slightly increased since 2011 and now sits around $50,225, just below the U.S. median 
income. Granville’s middle class is slanted toward the lower end of the distribution, more 
so than Cedar and Macomb (see Appendix 3A).   
There has been a small decrease in employment in manufacturing, although 
average wages have been increasingly higher for these jobs. The unemployment rate in 
Granville has been consistently low, but poverty has increased since 2008. Black 
populations in Granville have a much higher poverty rate than white ones (around 24%), 
but the recent increase in poverty rate has impacted white populations more, with the 
percent in poverty almost doubling from 6% to 12%. The main cultural themes emerging 
from Granville were 1) dependence on local over federal government, 2) distancing from 
Democratic politicians and 3) anxiety over race and gender.  
Demographic Trends 
Summary  
  There were common themes across demographics in each county. The 
populations of all three were notably aging; this was demonstrated in Census data but 
also noted by all public officials. Most officials addressed concerns that their county 
populations were aging and few college graduates and young families were moving back.  
All three counties were also majority white. Cedar had the largest percentage of 
white people, followed by Macomb and then Granville. In all counties, there has more 
recently been an increase in the presence of non-white populations: in Macomb, a greater 
degree of Chaldean and black citizens; in Granville, an increase in Hispanic and black 
populations; and in Cedar, an increased presence of black people that officials explain is 
due to through-traffic to cities like Cedar Rapids.  
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Unlike Granville and Macomb, Cedar has not shifted a great deal in terms of its 
demographics, and the perception of these changes was likely due to its small population 
size. In Cedar and Macomb the white populations have slightly declined while black and 
Hispanic populations have increased since 2000. In Granville, the population of the 
county has grown, along with every demographic group including white, black, Asian 
and Hispanic. The latter category has grown the most since 2000 (Policy Map Reports, 
2018). These numbers were apparent in census data and noted by public officials. The 
United States is becoming less white and more diverse as well. “In 2013, for the first 
time, the majority of newborn babies in the U.S. were racial or ethnic minorities.” The 
same year, a record-high 12% of newlyweds married someone of a different race 
(Dimock, 2017).  
 The population density varied across all three, with Macomb being the largest and 
most dense, followed by Granville and then Cedar.  
Figure 4.4 Population Density in Cedar, Macomb and Granville Counties  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Open Data Network, 2016  
All three counties had majority white populations.  In Macomb 81.9% of citizens 
are white. In Cedar. 98.69% of the population identified as white in 2000, and this 
number only slightly declined to 97.07% over the past 16 years. Granville has the 
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smallest percentage of white people in all three case studies at 61.26%. This has remained 
steady over the past seven years. Racial demographics vary between the north and south 
parts of the county, however, on average, towns in the north and south parts of Granville 
are just over 50% white.  
All three counties also noticed shifting demographics over time, although these 
shifts looked different in each county. Macomb has gotten slightly less white since 2010 
(U.S. Census).  (See Appendix 1B).	Between 2000 and 2016, the white population in 
Macomb changed by -2.38%, the African American population by 350.52%, and Asian 
population by 75.27% and Hispanics by 68.08% (Policy Map, 2018).  
Although small, Macomb’s black population is far larger than what is was in the 
late ‘60s and early ’70s when Macomb was growing, primarily with members of the 
white working class. At this time, barely any black people could be found living in 
Macomb’s suburbs right outside of Detroit. Across interviews, public officials in 
Macomb noted this increase in the black population. Mostly, these black citizens are 
moving to Macomb County from Detroit. U.S. Census data shows that this increase was 
noteworthy; the composition of black citizens in Macomb County increased 8% from 
2000 to 2016, and now represent 10.65% of the population. Another official observed 
that the movement of black people from Detroit to Macomb was more concentrated in 
some areas than others. Greenberg made a similar observation in his 2016 focus groups, 
noting the recent movement of African-Americans into Warren, Sterling Heights and 
Shelby townships in Macomb. In discussing race, an official involved in law enforcement 
noted that while there was an increase in crime as Macomb’s population grew, their 
numbers remained consistent as far as crime—the increase in crime was only correlated 
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to an increase in population. He noted it was not the composition of the population, but 
rather the numbers that drove the increase in crime.  
Figure 4.5 Percent Black Population in Macomb County  
 Percent Black Population 
2000  2007-2011  2010 2012-2016  
Macomb, MI  2.58%  8.04%  8.55%  10.55%  
 
  
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
Macomb has also seen growth among immigrant populations. Public officials in 
Macomb attribute some of that growth to the large Chaldean population (a group of 
Christian Iraqis) who have fled Iraq because of religion persecution and landed in 
Macomb. Macomb County became home to nearly 40% of Michigan’s refugee arrivals 
over the year 2013. In fact, Michigan ranked third across all 50 states in accepting 
refugees (Selweski, 2014).  Some 4,000 refugees settled in Michigan in 2014, over half 
from Iraq (U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement, 2014). An article in The Macomb Daily 
reports that local governments and charities are working to knock down “cultural 
barriers” that Chaldean families face in Macomb and are diverting resources to help these 
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refugees.  For example, the Chaldean Community Foundation, based in Sterling Heights, 
served 16,000 immigrants and refugees over the course of 2014-2015 (Chambers, 2015).  
However, refugees aren’t necessarily integrating in predominately white 
communities. While one public official described the county as “welcoming,” he 
explained that often immigrants live in poorer areas and group together. He continues to 
say that this has been a tradition with immigration throughout history – from Italians to 
Chinese populations. Immigrants traditionally live in the southern end of Macomb, in 
cities such as Warren and Sterling Heights.  Sterling Heights is also home to a growing 
Hispanic community. Around half of the families in Sterling Heights are foreign-born 
(Selweski, 2014).  The Hispanic population in Macomb has steadily grown to 2.4% of the 
population in 2016 (American Community Survey, 2016). 
In Cedar, while the county has remained majority white, public officials remarked 
that over the past five years, there has been a small increase in Hispanic, Asian and 
African-American populations. Due to the small population in Cedar, any small shift in 
demographics is more noticeable. In Cedar, between 2000 and 2016, the white population 
changed by -0.53%, the African American population by 730.77%, the Asian population 
by 186.54% and Hispanics by 95.32% (Policy Map Report, 2018). See Appendix 2B.  
One public official believed the Latino population had increased a “fair amount” 
since with 1990s in tandem with the growth of beef-packing plants. The movement of 
black and Latino populations are concentrated in cities with larger populations rather than 
smaller towns in Cedar. The percent of the population that are ‘foreign born’ has steadily 
increased over the years, but this population only makes up 1.17% of the population in 
2016.  
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Figure 4.6 Percent White Population in Cedar County; Figure 4.7 Percent Foreign 
Born Population in Cedar County  
 Percent White Population 
 2000  2007-2011  2010  2012-2016  
Cedar, IA   98.69% 97.59%  97.79% 97.08%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
As for minority populations in Granville, black people make up 30% of the 
population, which has slightly decreased over the years. The Hispanic population now 
makes up 7.48% of Granville population and has been steadily increasing over time. 
 Percent Foreign Born Population    
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Cedar, IA   0.7%  0.9% 1.17%  
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Most officials mentioned this growth in the Hispanic population in Granville; they 
observed that these communities might be dispersed around the county, but they are 
mostly in the North due to the relative dominance of agriculture there. Hispanic 
populations often lived in groups where they settled and were not as integrated with other 
demographic populations, according to public officials.  
 One public official noted that minority and white students were also not 
particularly integrated in Granville’s school system. The official explained that the 
“demographics of inner city schools are black and Hispanic—a lot of this has come about 
because of the charter schools.” More white families are moving their children to charter 
schools because they are “proclaimed to be a better education.” Due to this movement, 
local city schools have lost students to private and charter schools, and for the kids that 
come back, money doesn’t come with them.  
Figure 4.8 Percent White Population in Granville County, Stem and Oxford  
 Percent White Population 
2000  2007-2011  2010 2012-2016  
Granville, NC (red) 60.21%   59.82%   60.43%  61.26%  
Stem (town-blue)  94.39%  50.48%  83.59%  75.07%  
Oxford (town-brown)  44.27%  35.40%  38.59%  42.60%  
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Figure 4.9 Percent Hispanic Population in Granville County  
 Percent Hispanic Population 
2000  2007-2011  2010 2012-2016  
Granville, NC  4.33%    7.29%    7.48%  7.48%  
 
 
 
 
  
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
All three counties also had aging populations. Macomb County officials observed 
this trend occurring particularly in the southeast part of the county. Macomb County has 
had a steady uptick in the percent of the population 65 and up since 2007. Interestingly, 
the percent of those aged 18-20 plateaued and recently started decreasing to levels around 
three percent. The percent of the population 18-34 has remained steady around 20% for 
the past eight years (U.S. Census). One public official noted that Macomb was losing 
college graduates. (See Appendix 3B). 
Figure 4.10 Percent Population 65+ in Macomb County  
 Percent Population 65+  
2000  2007-2011  2010 2012-2016  
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Macomb, MI  13.65%   14.12% 14.29%  15.57%  
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
Officials in Cedar County also noticed the aging population in their county. The 
median age in Cedar County is 42.1 years, a five-year increase in median age since the 
2007 Census. The percent of the population in Cedar aged 65 and older has slightly 
grown over the years, now composing 18.21% of the population. On the other hand, those 
aged 18-34 now compose 17.23% of the population, a constant over the 2000-2015 time 
period. An official described the primary group in Cedar to be 50-plus years old and “not 
getting any younger.” However, some parts of Cedar County have attracted new 
residents—generally those parts of Cedar close to cities that are more affordable. One 
official predicted that expansion of Route 30 that runs through Cedar will likely make the 
county more attractive due to quicker access to the city of Cedar Rapids.  
Figure 4.11 Percent Population 65+ Cedar County  
 Percent Population 65+  
 2000  2007-2011  2010  2012-2016  
Cedar, IA   16.25%  16.79%  16.72%  18.21%  
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SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
In Granville, those aged 65 and older now compose an even larger part of the 
population, increasing to its highest level of 15.35% in 2016. Oxford, in the north, has 
aged even more drastically, with 65+ composing nearly 20% of the population. Those 18-
34 now make up less than 20% of the population, and this proportion has been decreasing 
over time. All public officials interviewed noticed aging in Granville. One official noted 
that going back 15 years, those moving in were young families, and today, while the 
south end of Granville has some new families move in, many of these are skewed to be 
more middle aged, with older children. Officials also said that many college-aged 
students were not returning to Granville, instead opting for more urban areas. 
Many also noticed a trend of more and more retired people moving to Granville. 
However, a north/south divide was also noticed in this trend. Officials saw more of a 
younger skewed demographic moving in to the Southern end and commuting to RTP and 
other jobs in bigger cities while more retired people seemed to be moving up North.  
Figure 4.12 Percent Population 65+ Granville County  
 Percent Population 65+  
2000  2007-2011  2010 2012-2016  
Granville, NC (red) 11.40% 12.27%  12.42%  15.35%  
Oxford (town-green)  18.63%   18.05% 19.43% 19.85%  
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
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In Oxford, a city in the Northern half, officials noted their growth progressing 
slowly but surely, driven by older demographics. They noted that millennial generations 
were not being drawn in. Over time, Oxford has become an older population; one Oxford 
official noted that the majority of voters are 60 and older. Another official echoed the 
sentiment, finding that the majority of people moving in are retired people coming back 
from the inner city area—returning for the “laid-back quality of Oxford.” Overall, the 
growth in the area of Granville that borders Virginia is described as being “very slow.”  
While officials in Oxford spoke of an aging population, officials in Creedmoor (in the 
southern end of the county) spoke of a population surge, both driven by younger retirees 
and younger families equally. One official noted that Creedmoor’s population has 
doubled in the past 30 years, and they are noticing even greater interest in the town the 
last four or five years. Butner, another town in Southern Granville, is experiencing a 
similar phenomenon and becoming more of a bedroom community. Officials say 
although families reside here, they often send their children to school and work in Wake 
County and therefore, “very little of their residual income is spent in Granville.” 
Voting Trends  
 Additionally, there were trends in voting across the three counties. Aside from all 
three voting twice for Obama—in 2008 and 2012—and then Trump in 2016, all three 
counties maintained similar voter turnout rates across all three elections, above the 60% 
level. However, there was a variance in turnout across demographics. In North Carolina, 
voter turnout among African Americans decreased in 2016, while white turnout across 
the state increased (Bitzer, 2017). Since Iowa is primarily white, the numbers did not 
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shift greatly over demographics in the elections (US Census Electorate Profiles). In 
Macomb, the voter turnout was actually slightly higher overall in 2016 than in 2012. 1 
Figure 4.13 Turnout Rates of Registered NC Voters for General Elections by Race  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Bitzer, 2017; NC Board of Elections, 2016 
Election data in all three counties indicates strong support for Trump. In Macomb 
Trump beat Clinton by more than 11%. Trump won Cedar County with 55.5% of the vote 
to Clinton’s 37.72% (Cedar County Election Archives). Granville County voters picked 
Trump with 50.1% of the vote (Politico Election Results, 2016), and the northern and 
southern parts of the county did not determine propensity to vote for Trump, as the map 
below demonstrates. In past elections, all three counties went for Obama, but largely at 
lower margins.  
 
 
																																																								
1 Macomb Board of Elections, 2016. No demographic breakdown available.  
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Figure 4.14 Voting in Granville County 2016 General Election by Precinct  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: NC Board Of Elections, 2016 
In Granville, Obama won 52.88% and McCain only captured 46% in 2008. In the 
2012 election, Obama won 51.75% of the vote to Romney’s 47.21%. See Appendix 1B 
and 2B for data on Macomb and Cedar Counties voting from 2008 to 2016.  
Voter turnout in Granville County was similar across all three elections, a trend 
observed in Macomb and Cedar as well. Voter turnout in Macomb County for the 2016 
presidential election was similar to previous elections: 68.73% compared to 66.1% in 
2012 and 69.2% in 2008. Turnout is very similar among all precincts, with no major 
outliers (Macomb County Election Data, 2016). In Cedar, voter turnout was 74.82% in 
2008 and 82.34% in the 2016 election. In 2012 and 2008, Granville was among the NC 
counties with the largest African-American turnout (Bitzer, 2017). 
Primary or caucus voters in all three counties chose Clinton as the Democratic 
candidate; in the primaries, Macomb and Granville supported Trump in the Republican 
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primary, while Iowa caucused for Cruz, with Trump close behind.2Macomb voted for 
Clinton with 48.8% of the vote, with Bernie Sanders following at 47.4%. Trump won 
Macomb County in more of a landslide in the Republican primary, capturing 48.4% of 
the vote, with Kasich coming in second with 22%. In the Iowa Caucuses, Clinton won 
49.8% of “state delegate equivalents.” The Democratic Party didn’t tally actual votes in 
caucuses (CNN voting data, 2016). Ted Cruz won Iowa Caucuses with 27.64% of the 
vote. Trump and then Rubio followed closely behind (CNN voting data, 2016). Granville 
voted for Clinton in the primaries with double the amount of votes that Trump received to 
also win the Republican primaries (NYT Election Results, 2016).  
Figure 4.15 Granville County 2016 Presidential Primary 3 
Granville County 2016 Presidential Primary  
Candidate  Percent of Vote  Number of Votes  
Donald Trump (W) 43.3%  2,215  
Ted Cruz  42.6%  2,180  
John Kasich  6.2%  319 
Hillary Clinton (W)  58.8%  4,693  
Bernie Sanders  34.0%  2,715  
SOURCE: New York Times Election Results, 2016 
In Granville, some officials remarked that they thought different voters might 
have come out in the 2016 election. An official hypothesized that the northern end of 
Granville County came out to vote more than ever before this year, noting that they have 
a “different way of thinking from the southern end” and “different views” likely leaning 																																																								
2 Cedar County does not report by precinct.  
3 The primary election in Macomb reflected the overall trends of the Granville Primary  
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more conservatively. One Stem official was also part of the group shocked by the 2016 
election saying, “Quite honestly it was very much a surprise—it was a reaction but 
exactly to what, I’m not sure.” Another official noted, “A lot of the rural people—the 
white farmers—those people turned out to vote for Trump and the African American 
community did not.” The same African-American political infrastructure was not there, 
the official noted.   
Other officials offered similar perspectives. One believed one cause of the big 
shift in the elections could be attributed to “a lot of people of color not going back to 
vote. A lot of people assumed ‘my vote won’t count.’” Another official shared an 
experience that seemed to affirm this notion. “I did a panel on MLK at an African-
American community Center. These people are the leaders and organizers of things like 
“Get Out the Vote.” The younger crowd is not replacing them—they are getting older and 
they are not trained to take the lead.” The official expounded that unity of black 
community matters especially in rural communities and can have a dramatic effect on 
elections. Another official shared this viewpoint, saying that over time, the influence of 
black ministers and political action committees in the black community has decreased 
significantly. This, the official believed, was a large factor in the populations going to 
vote in this county and could be a driving cause of Trump’s victory.  
In some interviews there was discussion about party alignment in the 2016 
election. In Macomb, public officials commented that while Macomb is generally 
Democratic, it has more centrist political tendencies. Because of this, in Macomb, the 
actual candidates have more to do with voting trends than any Washington policies. An 
	 68 
official stated, “Technically Macomb is more Democrat than Republican but people will 
look at any candidate they think is good—across party lines.”  
Officials noted that in local elections in Macomb County there was a small wave 
of Republicans elected in along with Trump. However, officials observed that this shift 
did not have a partisan impact on local leadership. Elected officials were described as 
“very centrally leaning” and it was noted that there were very few people “on the wings.” 
An official explained that on the county commissioner board there hasn’t been one vote 
recently that was along party lines. He says, unlike the rest of the country, Macomb 
seems to be less plagued by partisanship.  
In Granville County, public officials commented on the changing tradition of 
single-party dominance. One official noted that Granville used to be so Democratic that 
people were told to register as Democrats, regardless of their beliefs, so they would able 
to vote. However, this has been shifting more recently. In another interview, an official 
speculated, “Folks who turned out might be registered as Democrats, because they’ve 
been registered as that, but they are Republican and they just didn’t vote that much 
before.”  
 There were also changes in Granville’s 2016 local elections, but no one described 
these changes as drastic. Officials overwhelmingly described Granville as being 
historically Democratic, but shifting to be slightly more conservative with the influx of 
families moving in from cities as well as retirees. Three towns in the Southern end 
elected new mayors in the 2016 election. The Granville County Commissioner Board 
became more conservative in the last election, with three Republicans joining the 
board—a huge leap considering the first-ever Republican joined in 2012. However, board 
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members said they did not witness a lot of partisanship on their local boards, and both 
sides of the aisle tend to work on issues together.  
Economic Trends  
 Across three different counties, some major themes emerged. First, the 
assessment of the economy in each county was overall positive. Each county had a 
healthy economy, measured by quantitative assessments from Census data and qualitative 
assessments from public officials. Although economists debate the precise requirements 
for “full employment,” one expert proposes a usable definition of an unemployment rate 
of six percent (Inskeep, 2013). Macomb, Cedar and Granville counties all have 
unemployment rates that fall below this mark and have maintained this low number since 
the 2008-2010 time period surrounding the recession. The GINI coefficient, used to 
measure inequality, is also often used to describe the health of an economy. An indicator 
of “0” is complete equality and “1” is complete inequality. All three counties have GINI 
indexes under .5, and less than the U.S. overall GINI coefficient of .48. (See Appendix 
1C).  
 Manufacturing makes up a large part of the economy in all three counties. In each 
case, manufacturing has slightly declined in terms of the percentage of people it employs. 
This trend started during the 2008 recession. Since the recession, manufacturing has 
remained consistent for all three, with the exception of Cedar (which never experienced 
any notable decline, but rather slight fluctuations). However, the wages for 
manufacturing jobs have increased since 2011 and are trending upwards in all three 
counties. Additionally, the number of jobs across all industries are increasing and 
trending upwards in Macomb and remaining steady in Cedar and Granville. The percent 
	 70 
of workers have remained consistent for black, white and Hispanic populations (U.S. 
Census 2000-2016).  
 The poverty rate is the only sign of trouble in Granville and Macomb. Both have 
slightly trended upward since 2007. Granville County recently rose to be slightly above 
the poverty rate for the United States. Still, Macomb has remained below the U.S. 
poverty rate at 12% and Cedar’s poverty rate has slightly decreased since 2007 to 6.4%. 
It becomes more interesting to break down what populations are impacted by the poverty 
rate. While blacks and Hispanics have a far greater rate of poverty (in the country and in 
each county), their poverty rate has remained stable since the early 2000s, while the 
percent of white people in poverty has slightly increased since 2007 in the United States 
and in Granville and Macomb counties. Cedar is again the exception, with white people 
in poverty leveling off since 2007 (U.S. Census).  
As for the U.S. as a whole, “The U.S. economy is in much better shape now than 
it was in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Unemployment has plummeted from ten 
percent in late 2009 to below five percent today; the Dow Jones Industrial Average has 
more than doubled” (Dimock, 2017).  
Economies in all three counties have diversified over the past 16 years, moving 
away from being based almost entirely around manufacturing or agriculture. Today, all 
three economies are based largely around manufacturing, retail trade and health care and 
social assistance. Macomb County has the strongest roots in manufacturing of the three; it 
houses some of the biggest factories in the automobile industry.  
The white working class moved into Macomb County in the 1950s to fill the 
factories of these automobile giants. This included GM Buick’s assembly division, 
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Chrysler’s stamping plants and Ford’s transmission and chassis division (Greenberg, 
2017, p. 3). In interviews with public officials, each person mentioned Macomb’s strong 
manufacturing base. The general refrain followed that the economy has remained fairly 
constant, with the exception of the 2008 financial crisis. While there was a dip in 
economic prosperity during this time, the economy gained strength beginning in 2014, 
with general growth resulting and manufacturing and skilled jobs reappearing. Still, some 
believe that while the economy is growing, it has not gotten back to the level it once 
achieved, and likely never will. 
However, Macomb public officials also noted that more manufacturing for the 
defense industry has recently started growing and creating more jobs. Additionally, while 
manufacturing employment flat-lined during the recession, jobs in healthcare and social 
assistance have picked up. Accommodation and food services have also been increasing 
to make up more of the economy. These three make up the largest parts of the economy 
in Macomb. (See Appendix 1B).  
Although some manufacturing has been lost in Macomb, this does not seem to be 
greatly affecting the economy based on metrics like the unemployment and poverty rate. 
This is likely due to diversification into other economies; this adaption is necessary since 
the number of jobs in manufacturing has decreased nationwide. President of Macomb 
Community College James Jacobs believes that this diversification is vital, since 
renegotiating trade deals will not bring manufacturing jobs back. He thinks the central 
cause of the decrease in manufacturing jobs is the shifted is “growing reliance on 
automation” (Augilar, 2016).  Even if bringing manufacturing jobs back is not plausible, 
these jobs have cultural significance in Macomb. One public official explains that there 
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are deep roots in Macomb to manufacturing. Even if someone is now working in Career 
and Technical Education, as a nurse or a manager for the mortgage company, they likely 
still have family members—both past and present—that worked in factories. Therefore, 
as one public official mentioned, Trump’s campaign rhetoric about trade agreements had 
a strong appeal to a lot of Macomb voters. 
 The importance of these jobs transcends solely cultural significance. One public 
official described the economic stress falling beyond factory workers, explaining that 
union workers were affected by the recession, college graduates are finding extremely 
low-paying jobs in Macomb and people with law degrees are also not being paid what 
they would expect.  
Not all officials had negative assessments of Macomb’s economy. One public 
official says he has observed business pick up in Macomb since the end of recession, a 
trend he recognizes across the country. He noted that the small business barometer, 
measured by responses to surveys on optimism in future business in different regions, is 
positive for Macomb. He sees the barometer as a major indicator of how the economy 
will fare. Of all business establishments in Macomb, over half (54.4%) are classified as 
small, employing one to four people. Only 2.4% of businesses employ more than 100 
people (County Business Patterns 2014, Social Explorer; U.S. Census Bureau)  
Like Macomb, manufacturing has been a large part of Cedar and Granville’s 
economies at one point or another. However, both Cedar and Granville’s economies have 
historically been based around agriculture. 
In Cedar, over the years, the economy shifted from farming to manufacturing. 
However, since the 1980s, there has been a decrease in manufacturing jobs, and 
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employment has become more focused on service—reflective of the U.S. economy 
overall. While manufacturing has decreased since the 80s, manufacturing employment 
now remains relatively consistent. An official observed that while some manufacturing 
companies have cut back on jobs, other companies have employed more people. While 
jobs in the industry have not increased, wages in manufacturing have been steadily 
driving up since 2006, as illustrated below.  
Figure 4.16 Average Wage in Manufacturing in Cedar County  
 Average Wage in Manufacturing  
2000  2007 2010 2012   2016  
Cedar, IA  $31,661  $35,718 $43,161 42,904 $49,002 
 
 
 
 
S 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
Other parts of the economy have remained relatively stable as well. While the 
main specialty in the Cedar economy—Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting—has 
decreased in percent of people employed from 2000, since 2007 it has not declined 
further. Other major industries in Cedar have also not experienced noticeably sharp 
decline in either percent of jobs in the industry or averages wages in that industry.4 
																																																								4	Appendix 2B; The data for wages in health care and social assistance is unavailable 
from the U.S. Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics for Cedar County.  
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Overall, the average wage across all goods producing industries has increased, as 
depicted below.  
Figure 4.17 Average Wage Across All Good-Producing Industries in Cedar  
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
Large manufacturers and other major firms are not the only source of employment 
in and around Cedar. Small business has also fared well in terms of employment from 
2000 to 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). However, some public officials 
expressed concern about maintaining small businesses, due to the changing structure of 
Cedar’s economy and population base.  
In Granville, the economy was historically heavily based around tobacco, starting 
in the late 1800s and the early 1900s (Data USA, 2016). It was apparent in interviews that 
this was a rich part of Granville’s economic past. One official explained that at one time 
Granville had 500 tobacco farmers and now only 15 farms grow the same amount as 
before. One official in Oxford noted while “tobacco is a bad word now, it built both 
Oxford and Durham [in nearby Durham County].”  Officials in Butner had similar 
thoughts, noting that their town was also built on tobacco, but become home to other 
industries such as military manufacturing. As military manufacturing dwindled, the 
economy became more service-oriented.  
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 Similarly to Macomb, there has been diversification and fluctuation in the 
dominant industries in Granville.  While the number of jobs in the overall economy has 
remained stable over the past eight years, there has been fluctuation in Granville’s main 
industries. (See Appendix 3B). 
Figure 4.18 Percent Manufacturing Industry Employment in Granville County  
 Percent Manufacturing Industry Employment   
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Granville, NC   22.67%   16.52%  15.81%  
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2016  
Figure 4.19 Jobs in All Industries in Granville County  
 Jobs in All Industries    
 2010 2013  2015  
Granville, NC   15,288    15,154   15,328   
SOURCE: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016 
However, the wages for these industries paint a different picture. The average 
wage in manufacturing steadily increased over the years (BLS, 2016).  Retail trade wages 
have also been increasing over the years, but the average wage is less than half of wages 
for manufacturing jobs (See Appendix 3B). While wages for Health and Social 
Assistance are not available through the Bureau of Labor Statistics, equality of wages in 
this field is noticeably changing. For example, nurses and cashiers are two professions 
that make up a large part of the employment in two major industries in Granville. Among 
these professions in particular, the gap between white and black, Native American and 
multi-race workers started to close from 2014 to 2015 (Data USA, 2015).  Southern 
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Granville County has a much higher wage distribution than northern Granville County, 
with median incomes in the south around $20,000 higher than the north (Data USA, 
2015).   
Granville officials uniformly spoke of the county’s ability to adapt economically. 
One official said, “Granville County has been fortunate that when something leaves, 
something usually comes and fills in. We have always been able to reinvent ourselves no 
matter what—from farming to textiles.” County commissioners noted that proactive 
leadership in the county helped to keep Granville employed, and had done very well in 
this aspect, more so than other counties. Other officials touched on this idea as well. One 
explained, “Diversification has been our savior in Oxford and Granville County. We were 
able to recruit industry as tobacco fell such as Revlon—the largest manufacturer, located 
here in Oxford.” One official said those employed by the tobacco industry transitioned 
fairly seamlessly to the manufacturing industry when the shift in industry occurred and 
another official said Granville had been “successful in filling the void” by recruiting new 
industries. He noted that most of manufacturing jobs require a different skill set and 
Granville was very fortunate to have a community college that trains and equips 
individuals with these tools.   
Notably, Granville public officials largely viewed the economy overall as stable 
and building since 2012. Most official said that they did not hear many sentiments of 
frustration over the economy from citizens in Granville. One official in Butner said, “I 
haven’t really heard too many complaints other than some concerns over redeveloping 
the downtown.” Another said, “People don’t feel disgruntled about the economy and they 
like the distance from RTP. They just don’t like driving all the time.”  
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There were also less cheerful assessments of Granville’s economic conditions. 
One official contended that the low-skilled industries have not yet been replaced and this 
has left some residents unemployed. He said these people would rather not be on social 
service’s dime, and would take factory jobs if they were available, but many are not able 
to find work.  A factory that manufactures equipment recently announced they were 
consolidating, leaving a few fewer jobs in Granville, one official added. Additionally, the 
official said that agricultural jobs were almost completely gone. Similarly, another 
official noted that even though there were some government programs to help farmers, 
there is not much farming going on.  
In both Cedar and Granville Counties, officials spoke of the increasingly 
commuter nature of some parts of their counties. In Cedar, the economy is centered 
around three significant employment hubs that surround the county. Cedar Rapids 
processes goods such as cereal, and John Deere manufacturing makes up another major 
hub up in Waterloo, Iowa. Due to this structure, parts of Cedar become commuter 
communities. For example, according to a 2016 Tipton Laborshed report, the out-
commute is estimated to be 55.3%. Most that commute work in Iowa City, Coralville, 
Cedar Rapids or Wilton. Officials explain that Cedar is an ideal pick for a bedroom 
community, since some of its towns are 30 minutes away from three of the largest cities 
in Iowa. They noted it has increasingly become more and more of a trend to work in a 
city and live in towns like Bennett or West Branch.  
In Granville, officials noted that economic growth that is happening in their 
county is primarily occurring in the southern end. Officials in Butner commented that 
they felt as if the town was right on the cusp of greater economic growth, driven by 
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population growth coming from the bedroom community in Creedmoor. One of the major 
draws bringing people into the community is easy highway access to Durham and 
Raleigh. While officials commented that there was more business growth here, places 
like Creedmoor don’t see as manufacturing growth as in the north end of the county. 
Officials in both Cedar and Granville spoke of frustrations with commuter towns. 
Due to the model of small town infrastructures with access to larger cities, public 
officials lamented that it was difficult to develop new businesses downtown apart from 
service-related businesses. Officials in Cedar noted that this made it more difficult to 
attract young families to the area and raise taxes to develop more infrastructure. One 
official explained how the increasingly commuter-based population has also made raising 
taxes more difficult. Since lower taxes are often a major draw to living in smaller, more 
rural communities like Cedar, it is often difficult to attract people to Cedar if taxes are 
raised.  However, this desire to reduce taxes has reduced investment, which only fueled 
the sense of coffers being reduced, according to public officials.   
 Even with a shift over time of industry, all three counties have maintained low 
unemployment rates and been steadily recovering since the recession in 2008. Macomb 
hit the highest peak of unemployment than Cedar; while officials in Macomb addressed 
the recovery of the economy, officials in Cedar spoke of the steady unemployment rate. 
In Macomb, unemployment peaked in 2008 and then dove back down by 2016 to the low 
level of 5.2%. Jobs across all industries have slowly been increasing as well. (See 
Appendix 1B).  
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Figure 4.20 Unemployment Rate in Macomb County   
 Unemployment Rate  
 2000  2005  2010  2012  2016  
Macomb, MI  3.3%  6.6%  13.9% 9.8%  5.3%  
 
 
  
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
In Cedar, the unemployment rate hit its peak around the recession in 2009 at 
5.6%. It has also since steadily decreased, now sitting around 3.4%.  
Figure 4.21 Unemployment Rate in Cedar County  
 Unemployment Rate  
 2000  2008 2010  2012  2016  
Cedar, IA  2.2%   3.7%   5.4%  4.5%  3.4%  
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
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The overall unemployment rate in Granville also peaked, unsurprisingly, from 
2009-2012 and has since decreased back to its lowest levels in 2015 and 2016, at 4.3%.  
Figure 4.22 Unemployment Rate in Granville County  
 Unemployment Rate  
 2000  2005  2010  2012  2016  
Granville, NC  4.3%  6.0%   9.7%  8.0%  4.3%  
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2016  
Public officials in Cedar and Granville often referenced the significantly low 
unemployment rate. In Cedar, some officials said this was caused by a significant boom 
in job opportunities in 2016 and high job security. Others felt that while there was an 
increase in jobs, these were not necessarily the middle-income jobs people were looking 
for, and they were likely underemployed.  
Officials in Granville noticed similar phenomena, noting that “there is a job here 
in Granville” but consenting that sometimes that the jobs are less glamorous, and fewer 
people who go off to college are returning to Granville to take them. Another mentioned 
that while the unemployment rate was below the state average, the southern end of the 
county was driving this number.   
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In each county subtle shifts in the economy have disparate effects on different 
demographics. In Macomb, 24.46% of black people were in poverty in 2016. This 
number has slightly declined from 25.48% in 2007.  However, there are more black 
people in poverty today in Macomb than in 2011, due to the increase in the black 
population. As for the white population in Macomb, the percent in poverty has increased 
slightly over time. It grew from five to nine percent from 2000 to 2011 and then nudged 
upwards in 2012-2016 to 9.2%. While a much lower percentage of white people in 
Macomb are in poverty, a far greater number are impoverished: 70,800 today compared 
to 21,918 black people in poverty. 
Interviewees expressed a popular opinion among Macomb residents that regarded 
Oakland as the “rich” county nearby, giving them power to set the policy agenda and 
make decisions. Public officials said that “company executives types” live in Oakland. 
On the other hand, Wayne County, dominated by Detroit, is considered the poorest 
nearby county and therefore the greatest recipient of support, welfare and other benefits. 
In this popular understanding, Macomb exists in the middle, and while it certainty is not 
rich and powerful, it is also not poor enough to benefit from government help. Notably, 
Wayne County has a far larger black population than Macomb (US Census, 2016). This 
was not mentioned in interviews, but could potentially be driving resentment. Those in 
Macomb are struggling to remain in the middle class with what they view as very little 
assistance from government. Therefore, an official noted,  “the people of Macomb feel 
forgotten.”  
The perception that Wayne County receives more federal benefits, such as food 
stamps, is accurate. This measurement aligns with the percent of people in poverty: this 
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number is consistently higher in Wayne than Macomb. In this way, Macomb sees itself as 
struggling, but doing just well enough not to receive aid from the federal government. 
Macomb fits perfectly into the old saying, “between a rock and a hard place.” The rock 
represents the wealthy,who always come out ahead, and the hard place represents those 
receiving all the government benefits and aid.  
Figure 4.23 Percent of People in Poverty Wayne and Macomb Counties  
 
 
 
 
 
Wayne- black, Macomb-red  
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
A similar sentiment appeared in Greenberg’s research of the Reagan Democrats:  
Middle class anxiety: The “upper class – they got all the tax breaks,” so they were 
privileged; but so too were “the people that are on welfare.”  In their view, the middle class 
carried society and government on its back and was indispensable to the survival of the 
nation. Though politically impotent, the middle class had historically played a heroic, 
selfless role. If the middle class refused its obligations, the social order would come to a 
grinding halt (Greenberg, 1985, p.8).  
In Cedar, due to homogeneity, the effects of the economy have been mostly 
similar across different races. The percent of white people in poverty has decreased since 
2011 where it slightly peaked, likely in line with the recession. Now, it hovers around six 
percent. Census data demonstrates that minorities were hit harder by the recession in 
Cedar, although the seeming scale of these changes is magnified by the small number of 
people concerned. For example, while Census data shows that 38.46% of black people 
were in poverty in 2000, this number dropped to 4.08% in 2016. The poverty rate for the 
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Hispanic population mirrored that of black and Asian populations in Cedar County, 
sharply increasing in the 2007-2011 time period and then significantly decreasing by 
2016.  
Figure 4.24 Percent White People in Poverty in Cedar County  
 Percent White People in Poverty  
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Cedar, IA  5.43%  7.18%   6.22%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
Figure 4.25 Percent Hispanics in Poverty in Cedar County  
 Percent Hispanics in Poverty   
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Cedar, IA  4.79%   47.88%  8.9%  
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
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Federal assistance rates mirrored these patterns of poverty. The percent of the 
population receiving food stamps peaked around 2012 and has been slowly decreasing 
since 2014. It leveled off around eight percent (U.S. Census, 2016). (See Appendix 2B). 
Granville County had the highest poverty rate of the three counties studied. In 
Granville, 16.3% of people live below the poverty line—higher than national average of 
14.7%. As for the demographic breakdown, 12.02% of white people live in poverty, 
compared to 24.04% of black people and 31.6% of Hispanics. Interestingly, this 
percentage has increased for all three demographics since 2011.   
One Oxford public official described a potential reason for a higher poverty rate 
to be the perceived unemployability of workers with criminal records. The official 
believes they have a lot more employable people but “because of past infractions they 
can’t find work.” After meeting with a lot of these people, the official believes they want 
to be productive members of society, but have no choice but to take social assistance to 
survive. This official asserted that these policies about criminal records target black 
populations in Granville County. 
Changes in the poverty rate differ between the north and the south parts of the 
county. As the graph below demonstrates, towns in northern Granville have an increasing 
a far higher poverty rate in comparison to towns, like Creedmoor, in the southern half.. 
While employment data is not available specifically for Oxford and Creedmoor, the 
discrepancy in the increase in poverty and the decrease in unemployment across the 
county is notable.  
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Figure 4.26 Percent of People in Poverty in Oxford and Creedmoor  
 Percent of People in Poverty   
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Granville, NC (red)  11.67%   11.35%  16.47%  
Oxford (North end town- blue)  21.33%  21.78%  25.83%  
Creedmoor (South end town: green)  11.48% 12.43%  8.79% 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
Figure 4.27 Percent White People in Poverty in Granville County  
 Percent White People in Poverty    
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Granville, NC  7.68%  6.68%  12.02%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
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Cultural Trends  
Across interviews in all three counties, three major cultural trends emerged: 1) 
little involvement with federal government policy, 2) shifting party alignment, and 3) 
elements of white status anxiety.  
1. Little Involvement with Federal Government Policy  
A theme that emerged across all three counties was the lack of impact and 
interaction of federal government with local communities. People in Granville, Cedar and 
Macomb do not look primarily to the government for policy changes that impact their 
day-to-day life. For this, they turn to their local officials, with whom they often have 
relationships. An official in Cedar noted that local issues dominate day-to-day life for the 
citizens of Cedar and therefore the public officials in charge of these relationships are the 
ones they turned to. One official in Macomb explained that most people have no idea 
about federal government policies. People just want “taxes to be low, the crime rate to be 
low, the roads to be good and the schools to be good.” If after awhile they don’t believe 
leadership is bringing that to them, they’ll look for something new. An official in 
Granville County said, “From a managerial standpoint, local government in rural areas 
are much more engaged with the population than government in a city area.” The 
intimate environment makes local governance more available and communities are far 
more engaged with their local governments than any government at the federal 
government. Further, the Granville official believed that this remains true about 
economic development; most people are more interested in growth and policies at local 
levels than at federal or even state levels. 
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Officials across counties also noted that by the time federal policy or funds 
reached their rural counties, the effect was insignificant. Officials in Granville brought up 
the “trickle-down of funds” from the federal government to Granville as a potential driver 
of the focus on local government. Officials explained that when the money is divided up, 
after metropolitan areas get their share, the money comes to rural areas and they must 
work with what they are given—which is never enough. An official explained, “They do 
a lot of things in Washington, but it takes a long time to come down the everyday 
people.” Local governments, however, are interacting with these people every day and 
hearing from constituents directly. Another elected official mentioned, “Right now 
nothing is getting done [In Washington], nothing. So we sort of take ourselves away from 
that, run our own government here. So long as we stay in the guidelines of the federal 
government.” Another official explained “what happens in Washington ends up being so 
far away, it’s years before it gets to us and often insignificant.” He said it doesn’t matter 
if “It’s Carter, Clinton, Obama, Trump…it works the same way.” Another official 
believes that Granville citizens have just “turned off” from the politics of Washington, 
since it feels like not much gets done no matter who is in charge.  Even at the level of 
local officials, they say much of their funding does not come from a federal level, so they 
balance budgets and make decisions without federal policy at the top of their list of 
considerations.  
 Public officials in Cedar struggled to think of federal policies that had any major 
or controversial effects on their county since 2008, describing the federal government as 
“stagnant.” Further, because Cedar does not have a very diverse or populous community, 
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federal issues have not affected them much over the years. Officials believe places like 
Iowa City, a more populous area, would be where the impact of federal policies are felt. 
Officials in Macomb believed that people’s perception of the world was based 
less on a real understanding of what policies were being implemented and more about 
what news channel they subscribed to. The seat of the president, in this way, is more 
symbolic than functional.  
Finally, officials often noticed the importance of a “good candidate,” with rhetoric 
and ideas that citizens could relate to. One official in Macomb explained this: 
“Technically Macomb is more Democrat than Republican but people will look at any 
candidate they think is good—across party lines.” Officials in Granville also spoke of the 
importance of the candidate, rather than the party, in the county. One official said, “I vote 
for the person not the party—and 90% of people are like this in Oxford.” For example, he 
said, farmers loved Jesse Helms, so even though they were Democrats and he was a 
Republican, they still voted for him. 
2. Shifting Party Alignment  
Many officials across counties also discussed disillusionment with the Democratic 
Party based on identity politics among white, working-class voters. In part, this resulted 
from a changing definition of “Democrat” and shifts in party alignment. Some members 
of the white working class did not feel included if they did not fall into categories like 
black, transgender, or immigrant. Officials in all three counties noted that Trump spoke in 
ways that people related to, both in his rhetoric and ideas.  
In Macomb, officials relayed that while voters historically identified as 
“Democratic,” this encompassed a different meaning in earlier years. Officials identified 
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a cultural split between older, conservative, blue-collar Democrats and younger 
millennial Democrats and their views on almost everything—from gay and transgender 
issues to political correctness. In one interview, a public official said that the Democratic 
Party did not address issues Macomb county voters identified with. The official felt that 
the Democratic Party has shifted to be aligned around identity politics. “Are you a 
transgender person in a wheelchair, are you black, are you gay?” In this way, people who 
identify as middle-class Americans without a distinct ethnic identity or identity with a 
marginalized community, ironically, felt marginalized by the Democratic Party.  
Public officials in Cedar also spoke of a “reinvigorated conservatism.” While 
moderate conservatism has always been a part of Iowa, officials have noticed more 
polarization and believe the Trump election was a reflection of this.  One official said that 
“Growing up in Iowa, I liked that we were moderate, that intersection where liberal and 
conservative philosophy worked very well together.” This official spoke of a strong sense 
of individualism inherent to Cedar. Another public official mentioned that the idea that 
“everyone should take care of themselves” has seemed to resurface more recently. While 
Iowa normally aligns itself straight down the middle, officials believe that as the 
population has aged, it has gotten more conservative. One official noted that the 
“[Trump] election is a reflection of baby boomers getting old and getting mad.”  
While Granville has traditionally been a Democratic county, at least nominally, 
officials have noticed an increase in conservative thought. Officials noted that Granville 
County is “progressive in some ways but leans a little conservative.” Some officials 
addressed the idea that “people in rural areas tend to be more conservative than liberal in 
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their thinking.” One mentioned the influx of new people in the Wilton area, in the south, 
had brought a stronger Republican base.  
Public officials believed that Democratic policies were not registering with more 
rural voters. An official in Macomb believed that the people in the county thought that 
Democrats paid attention to issues that were trivial to them: for example, transgender 
bathrooms. Another official articulated this thought as well—“blue collar union workers 
felt that the Democratic Party had forgotten about them.” One official thought the 
Democratic Party’s enthusiasm for and ownership of  “political correctness” has led to 
greater divisiveness by playing further into the identify politics that left out the white 
working class. Officials in Granville also critiqued the Democratic Party for not being 
attuned to the rural population, addressing some rhetorical and policy-related concerns. 
“Hillary could have made things plainer to the everyday person,” one official argued. 
“Grassroots people need to see a need in order to go vote for something…she didn’t 
communicate that to the everyday person.” The official argued that by contrast, Obama 
was able to do that in 2008. 
Further, public officials in Granville mentioned specific policies, long associated 
with the Democratic Party, that were not hitting home with a large part of Granville 
County. One official noted, “As Democrats, we need to be very careful on this area of 
gun control and be careful on where we stand so we don’t lose our base.” The official 
described an incident in the county in which a couple was murdered that resulted in “tons 
of people” coming to get gun permits. He described a feeling in the community that evil-
doers are getting away. The official also mentioned that minimum wage policy did not 
translate well in rural towns. He said that when Obama talked about raising the minimum 
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wage, some small employers in Granville indicated that if that happened, they would 
have to cut the work force and just bring people in part-time people to get around paying 
benefits and salaries. So, this “wasn’t a home run for the Democrats,” and things like the 
minimum waged needed to move in increments, in order to not frighten business owners 
and workers in small towns.  
Officials in all three counties also addressed the unpopularity of Clinton as a 
candidate. Reasoning for her unpopularity was mainly centered around distrust of the 
candidate and issues with Clinton being a female candidate. In Macomb, public officials 
described distrust of Clinton and the establishment politics she represented. One official 
said, “I really believe that a lot of people are looking for a change in how government is 
run—Congressmen are all millionaires and they’re locked into a money base as far as 
voting.” The official said that people were not ready for Clinton. They distrusted her from 
reports on the news and were wary of her career in politics. One official described it as 
looking like the “same-old-same-old...another dynasty family with roots on the coast.” 
One official noted that even Bernie Sanders supporters seemed to have hard feelings 
towards Clinton and did not seem excited about voting for her. The official remembers a 
Congressional meeting that broke into a fight between Sanders and Clinton camps and 
believes some Sanders supporters assumed Clinton would win and didn’t vote for her in 
protest. The official believes had they known Clinton was vulnerable they would not have 
made the same decision.   
 Another official believed both Obama and Trump benefitted from being perceived 
as outside of the establishment, newcomers of sorts to the political game. “Admittedly, it 
was strange that Trump was perceived as an outsider in some ways, but he seemed to 
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come off that way to people in Macomb.” Trump seemed to not speak in rehearsed 
words; this simple language resonated with people. Another official explained, “What I 
heard over and over again: he tells it like it is and we need a politician to do that.” 
 Some officials in Cedar believed that Obama was well-liked, but did not resonate 
with the strong middle class in Iowa, and Clinton was seen as an extension of more of the 
same. Officials noted that while some people did not really like Trump, they just couldn’t 
bring themselves to vote for Clinton. In one interview, an official said “people saw 
Clinton as just an extension of Obama and thought, nothing is going to change, in fact it’s 
probably going to get worse. She was screwed from the get-go.”  
Others thought Clinton’s disability to connect should have been more obvious to 
the Democratic Party. “When you go back and look at when primaries started and Bernie 
was doing so well—[that] should have been a real ominous wake-up call, that something 
was not connecting with young people.” Others mentioned similar ideas, saying people 
were against Clinton, and even those that voted for her did so unenthusiastically. The 
election, they thought, was a result of a vehement anti-Clinton population and an 
enamoredness with Trump by rural people. 
A handful of officials in each county noted that they thought people may not have 
been ready for a women to win the presidency. In Granville, one female official noted, 
“At times it’s hard to accept the fact that women that have opinions and visions about 
ideas and government—that’s just a historical thing.” Another official said he “listened to 
an interview that Hillary did herself—she said our county has grown in terms of a race, 
and they outgrew it, but people aren’t quite as ready to look past the gender piece.” He 
reflected that “maybe there is more to that—not being ready for a woman—than I 
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realized. I thought we had grown more into this than maybe we have.” Another official 
said that because “NC has a lot of the mindset that women can’t be in power and women 
can’t rule the nation,” more people in rural areas went out and voted for Trump. Some 
believed gender drove negative sentiment of Clinton more than race drove positive 
support for Trump. An official from Granville said, “Being from the south, we accepted 
Obama as first black president very well… I just don’t understand after a year they just 
don’t understand that Hillary lost and like him or not, [Trump] is in there.” 
3. White Status Anxiety  
There was a trend across all interviews with public officials that addressed racial 
and class status anxiety. Sometimes, interviewees discussed racism bluntly; other times 
they mentioned ideas of discomfort with change. In one interview, a Granville official 
mentioned that in reflection, the election of Obama “caused more racial tension than I 
gave it credit for. And what we saw was people responded through voting.” All public 
officials noted cultural anxiety, largely revolving around race, whether it be black and 
Chaldean populations in Macomb, a fear of surrounding populations in Cedar, or greater 
influx of Hispanic populations in Granville. An important part of these conversations was 
the perception of “unfairness” among the lower-middle class and more white, rural areas. 
Understanding that these two components—race and status—work in tandem, this trend 
is best described as white status anxiety. 
Macomb officials addressed a feeling of  “unfairness” among their constituents. This 
idea was expressed as the notion of the forgotten middle class. The juxtaposition with 
neighboring counties—of Wayne being poor enough to benefit from the government and 
Oakland being rich enough to have power in government – created resentment among the 
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middle class population in Macomb. One official described it as a feeling that the wealthy 
shape policy, the very poor benefit from policy and the middle is “just there to pay for it 
all.” 
Race played an important role in this notion of unfairness. One public official 
identified tensions in the community of Macomb’s white working class regarding 
affirmative action programs. They resented the entrenched nature of the policy despite its 
being, in their view, widely disliked and counterproductive. In the eyes of the white 
working class, contractors have a harder time getting a job because of federal stipulations 
that lean towards black people. In an interview, a different official described that racial 
factors definitely went into play with white factory workers when people moved in from 
Detroit. Another public official lamented that yes, issues did fall along racial lines in 
Macomb, but it was nothing dissimilar to “issues the country has dealt with forever.”  
Greenberg writes about how clearly one exchange mimics the feelings outlined in 
the Reagan 1985 focus groups:  
Adding to the brew is the recent movement of African Americans into Warren, Sterling Heights and 
Shelby townships in Macomb. One exchange in the more blue-collar men’s group:  
 
-   Steve: We’re struggling. We tried to apply for a BRIDGE card, we get denied because she’s a 
nurse. Her income. And it just – at the time, it just irritated me because we’d be at the grocery store, 
just looking at each other. How are we going to pay for all this and I’ll see somebody with a basket full 
of stuff, loaded with – just overloaded, use a BRIDGE card wearing top of the line stuff, $500 purse 
and then they walk to an Escalade. What is wrong with this system, we get denied ….. 
– Chris: Cash withdrawals. William: Cash withdrawals, and here I’m struggling to get my kid hot 
dogs and you’re buying a porterhouse and I’m being told that I’m wrong or I’m racist or I’m 
not the – I’m privileged and that’s what’s wrong.  
– Chris: It’s almost like you wonder how are they working the system that you’re not.  
Matt: It’s kind of off color, [but] I think we’re checking the wrong box when we’re filling out 
paperwork. 
 
The conversation highlights prevailing racial tensions in the context of the economy 
as well as irritation with political correctness. In my interviews, public officials conveyed 
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a similar sentiment. Greenberg also found in 1985 that the white middle class felt that the 
government treated different races unequally:  
Exit polls in metropolitan Detroit found 70 percent identifying “crime in the streets” as the 
number-one problem—the catchall for everything that angered Macomb’s white middle-class 
voters.  These workers saw themselves as members of a new minority class that was ignored 
by the government but forced to support social programs that did not benefit them. A male 
union member put it this way: “Why are we being discriminated against right now? Well, I’m 
going to start calling us a minority.” These white defectors from the Democratic Party 
expressed a profound distaste for black Americans, a sentiment that pervaded almost 
everything they thought about government and politics. 
 
While Detroit and racial tensions were less of a flashpoint in Greenberg’s focus 
groups surrounding the Trump election, similar feelings still prevailed. For example, 
Greenberg explains, “They feel getting to the American dream is hard enough and they 
should be at the front of the line: “I’m all for everybody having the American dream, but 
I feel that it’s being taken away from a lot of people by people coming and taking 
advantage.” 
In Granville, anxiety around race emerged in many interviews. One official 
bluntly said, “I think racism was a huge part of the vote—Trump clearly aligned with 
racist elements.” The day after he won, there was a truck going down the street with 
confederate flags. People were saying “We won, we won, we won kinda thing” the 
official explains. He said, in the rural areas of our state, “people are racist.” One official 
interestingly mentioned that there were closet voters for Obama as well as Trump. “When 
[Obama] was in office “you couldn’t get a single white person to tell you that they voted 
for him.” This comment seemed to address a tension among the white working class that 
voting for Obama would make you a traitor of some sense, and hurt your white cohort.   
 Officials in Granville also addressed other racially charged issues. For example, 
an official mentioned that the influx of charter schools had caused schools to become 
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more racially identifiable and pulled resources away from public schools. The official 
believes this has had a negative impact on the Oxford community.  
Other notions of unfairness arose from tensions between minorities and law 
enforcement. A public official in Macomb expressed that police officers had felt unfairly 
targeted by the federal government—punishing the entire profession for the missteps of a 
few (in reference to events of on-duty police officers shooting young black men). For 
example, law officers are now unable to receive military equipment, and the equipment 
for the SWAT team was recalled because it looked too militarized, he explained. 
However, even when there was high tension and negative public sentiment among police 
officers, he felt that police officers in Macomb were still getting a ton of support from 
their county.  
Similarly, in Cedar, uneasiness over race (among a homogenous population) was 
mentioned in many interviews. One driver of this fear has been a perception of an 
increase in crime. One official noted that the impact of a close proximity to three larger 
cities and the perception of crime (which is more significant than actual reality of crime) 
leads to people feeling as if it’s a “dangerous world out there” and fuels a desire to be 
more insular. Also contributing to this fear was the reaction of people in Cedar County to 
recent events with police and black men. One official noted that although the majority of 
Cedar is “middle-aged white folk,” conversations around race are still happening, largely 
due to the “through-traffic” of African-Americans in Iowa that comes through an 
interstate on the way to Cedar Rapids. This population passing through is often perceived 
to be associated with drug-trafficking. People felt that cops might lose rights due to 
negative public sentiment and it was going to make them more powerless to stop crime. 
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One officer believed that taking away pat searches would lead to less officer safety and 
concerned communities in Cedar. People also believed there was overall a decrease in 
law enforcement and military from movements like ‘Hands Up Don’t Shoot’ that they did 
not agree with. The official noticed that even people who never seemed to care about 
officers before were caught up in a “patriotic swing” and wanted to support their law 
enforcement officials.   
Some officials in Cedar and Granville spoke of changes in demographics creating 
subtle tension in their communities. Cedar officials described that their constituents felt 
worried by social waves they seemingly had no control over, likely encompassed in these 
fears about crime, race, and terrorism. Officials noted that conversations around racial 
tensions were “stuffed in a closet” and it took Trump to bring them out. Another official 
noted the increased fear along racial lines, although this fear is often subtle and 
understated. The official outlined this example: “If you did a survey, people say they like 
our good schools. But they may not be as good as we perceive them to be—they are 
pretty homogenous and they aren’t cutting edge by any means…While they might [be 
successful in some ways]… there might be another reason people are attracted to the 
schools [and not the ones in cities surrounding Cedar]: the perception of safety due to less 
people of color.” One official in Cedar noted that the “rural ghetto downtown” created a 
strong dynamic of fear around those in retirement or close to retirement.  
 Officials in Granville mentioned an increased presence of the Hispanic 
population. When asked if these communities were interacting with different populations 
in Granville one official said, “I don’t see a whole lot of whites and Hispanics 
interacting.” Another official indicated the Granville county human relations committee 
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noticed some reservations in the community around the increase in Hispanic population. 
Officials also noted increased efforts to target services to Hispanics and a general 
welcoming of this population, in tandem to the increase. Most of the services targeting 
Hispanics came from higher levels, such as USDA. An official explained that programs 
from the USDA served populations with increased Hispanic presence, including 
Granville. While the official said he had not gotten much feedback about the program, 
USDA did a conference call where local governments can call in all over the county, and 
many had a lot of questions and were very concerned. Officials believed that Hispanics 
moved to Granville because they were needed in the agricultural scene and another said 
that several companies have an employee ratio that included an increased number of 
Latinos over 2015-2016. This still was not a lot, he noted, but still an increase.   
Officials in all three counties mentioned concerns about terrorism and 
immigration in their counties as well. In Macomb, many expressed fear around 
immigration, both about the change in culture and concerns of more serious matters, such 
as terrorism. One Macomb official said,  “Anything new, anybody new, any different 
cultures and languages—we all get nervous when new things happen, we’re human—
we’re oversensitive and concerned over what’s going on in this neighborhood.”  The 
official continued to say that while everything new is met with some skepticism by some, 
he feels Macomb often prevails over being frightened of “the wrong things.”  
Cedar officials described a similar fear of terrorism and immigration. Although 
there is not a sizable immigrant population in Cedar, people still felt concerned about 
immigrants based on world events. An official said he noticed more “xenophobic type 
conversations” and said people were responsive to Trump bringing money back to “us” 
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and not giving it away to everyone else, referring to different countries. Beyond just 
giving money away, officials observed that people in Cedar thought in his last term 
Obama was “putting his head in the sand” when it came to efforts against terrorism. 
Trump, on the other hand, seemed more aggressive in this area, and this made him 
attractive to Cedar voters, even against other Republicans. In an interview, an official 
explained that the “us vs. them” narrative had a strong reverberation and acceptance, 
especially in Cedar, where there is a strong sense of “being rural.”  In Granville, many 
officials observed that “immigrants don’t come and stay for the most part” and that they 
did not see this population as being a large part of Granville. One official noted that for 
the part, “Granville sees a continuation of many of the same things.”  
According to public officials, their constituents often related to Trump’s rhetoric. One 
Macomb official spoke about the appeal of Trump’s rhetoric; he said while people were 
not necessarily opposed to immigration, they were opposed to illegal immigration. 
Realizing that he, along with “99% of his friends” descended from immigrants from one 
part of the world or another, he believed some immigration was okay. However, he 
stipulated that everything used to be a process with “no free run over the border.” People 
were drawn to Trump because they want things done by the rules. He believed Trump 
said things others were scared to, and stuck his neck out in ways few were willing. This, 
he said, made Trump appeal to Macomb voters even over other Republican candidates. 
“He seemed to know the pulse of the people.” Officials in Cedar thought rather than his 
policy, it was his “plain-talk” and ideas of “going back to how it had been” that resonated 
with people. Officials also spoke of insular communities, making it more plausible for 
ideas around conservatism to spread.  
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 Lastly, officials expressed sentiments in their communities that small shifts in 
culture that were causing uneasiness. In Cedar, one official described a new dynamic in 
the town of West Branch caused by an increase of younger families and some college 
graduates moving into the town. The official says this shift has helped to make the feel of 
the community a bit more liberal and less conservative. However, this cultural change is 
in stark contrast with an older, more conservative generation, who are not necessarily 
looking for change. The official believes the 2016 election might have been a reaction of 
the older generation to a newer, more liberal group moving in. The official noticed more 
tension on the city council between the “old boys club” and the younger women newly 
elected to council.  
 In Granville, there were other scattered comments about fears of change, 
encapsulated by statements like, “it’s kinda hard getting some of the citizens to change.” 
From mentions of declines in work ethic in schools and jobs, to skepticism around gay 
rights, a general theme emerged that some citizens in all three counties, progressive and 
conservative alike, might be fearful of change in their community and beyond. This can 
especially be attributed to an aging population that has certainly not used to such a rapid 
speed of change. These sentiments are best summarized in a statement by a Butner 
official: “People always want things to get better but they never want things to change.”  
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS  
 After understanding the literature surrounding the presidential election, a review 
of America’s history of nationalism and nativism, and three case studies in bellwether 
counties, my analysis finds white status anxiety to be a core cause of the shift from 
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Obama to Trump. While white status anxiety had the most dominant role in causing the 
shift, other theories clearly played important supporting and interacting roles.  
White status anxiety, produced by the interaction of historical institutions that 
created privileged white status in America and ongoing demographic shifts, set the stage 
for Trump’s brand of racial-nationalism populism. This brand of populism addressed 
economic uncertainty stemming from white working class status anxiety: minorities and 
women gaining an equalizing position in both the economy and overall society. This 
anxiety caused different white working class voters to come out and vote in the 2016 
election. While Trump gained a new voter base, Democrats failed to mobilize their own 
base to turnout for Clinton.  
My analysis is organized as follows:  
1. Different people voted in the 2016 election  
 Census data indicates a record number of Americans voted in the 2016 election 
but the composition of these voters shifted. Black voter turnout fell, white voter turnout 
increased and the non-white electorate remained stagnant in 2016. Election data 
demonstrates high turnout among white working class voters (Cohn, 2018).  
While no election data or public official is able to definitively determine that new 
people voted in the 2016 election, a handful of officials did comment on this possibility. 
Some recognized the decline of black voters and others noted how Trump spoke to a 
different group of people than usual: rural white voters. One official noted how the 
election seemed to be a “reaction to something.” The analysis of voting patterns both 
nationally and throughout the case studies demonstrated that while African-American 
turnout decreased, overall turnout remained high. (See Appendix C). This is likely due to 
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a group of white working class voters who emerged in the 2016 election because they had 
not felt compelled to vote by any candidate until Trump. 
Compounding Trump’s growing voter base was the inability of the Democratic 
Party to motivate their base to come out in the 2016 election. The Democratic Party 
clearly failed to relate and address the anxieties of the white working class; there was a 
clear theme across counties of a frustration with the Democratic Party and shifting party 
alignment due to a disagreement with Democrat priorities including identity politics and 
focus on racial equality.  However, Democratic failings do not explain the failure of other 
traditional Republican candidates in the primary against Trump. In interviews, officials 
often mentioned that Trump appealed to constituents more than other Republicans.  
2.  The economy mattered, but was not the main driver of election results  
Economic situations did not solely drive the 2016 election results, but rather were 
intertwined with anxiety over status, both in society and the economy. Additionally, 
qualitative data in cases studies demonstrated that citizens in more rural communities are 
often not looking to the federal government for policy changes; they often look to local 
governments who impact their day-to-day lives. Therefore, the importance of the 
president seems to be more symbolic to these communities. If citizens are not attuned to 
or reliant on policies from the president, then the president’s rhetoric and symbolism are 
more important factors than a candidate’s economic policy.  
In 2016, Trump’s form of racial-nationalist populism employed rhetoric that 
spoke directly to the white working class around economic uncertainty. While the 
economies of the counties in the case studies were overall healthy, even perceptions of 
change in the economy can lead to increased anxiety, targeted towards racial out-groups. 
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In the three case studies, economic crisis or decline was not observed in any of the 
counties, but economic uncertainty did exist. This uncertainty was caused by 
diversification in economies and relative economic status—specifically the relative 
position of the white working class juxtaposed to minorities—as opposed to their 
economic status outright.  
Many members of the white working class perceived minorities to be gaining a 
higher economic and social status in American society, and responded with anxiety about 
the ramifications for themselves. In case studies, I found that while the poverty rate of 
black and Hispanic populations was far higher than white populations, the poverty rate of 
whites has increased since 2008, while the poverty rate for minorities has remained 
stagnant. While black (75%) and Hispanic Americans (72%) express more concern about 
unemployment than white Americans, there was a sharp divide on this metric between  
class for white Americans. Sixty-seven percent of white working class fear 
unemployment compared to 55% of college-educated Americans (Cooper et al, 2016). 
The slightly declining economic status of the white working class and stagnant economic 
status of minorities in these counties contributes to white working class anxiety around 
racial status.  
Overall assessment of the counties’ economies indicated healthy growth or 
stability. Most counties had diversified their economies and were employing similar or 
greater amounts of people since the 2008 recession. Officials described not only 
quantitative assessments that demonstrated growing or healthy economies but also overall 
had positive outlooks about the economies of their counties. Their assessment validated 
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that the economies did not only appear to be doing well, but those living in the counties 
described a positive sentiment and experience with their economies.   
National surveys further demonstrated that racial anxiety was more highly 
correlated with voting for Trump than economic anxiety. For the white working class, 
surveys found concerns over cultural displacement and immigration concerns were the 
best predictors of voting for Trump (Cox, 2017). In the 2016 ANES survey, those who 
voted for Trump scored far higher than Clinton voters on a scale of black influence 
animosity and racial resentment. (Black influence animosity is a measure that examines 
voters’ views about whether the U.S. government favors black people over white people 
and how much influence black people have in U.S. politics.) The relationship is modeled 
below (McElwee, McDaniel, 2017). Anxiety over changing demographics, race, and 
status was observed across all case study interviews. This anxiety was mentioned in each 
interview, either subtly or more bluntly. For example, one official noted that “Racism 
certainly played a role in the election results.”  Additionally, a majority (54%) of the 
white working class and 67% of Trump supporters say that they are at least somewhat 
worried about being the victim of terrorism (Cox, 2017).  On the other hand, black and 
Hispanic respondents tended to express significantly higher levels of economic peril 
compared to whites and economic hardship proved to be a predictor of a vote for Clinton 
( Green, 2017; Cox, 2017). 
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Figure 5.1 Anti-Black Racial Animus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: McDaniel, 2017  
3. White Status and the Zero-Sum Game   
A Harvard Business School and Tufts Psychology department study found that 
whites increasingly have a view of race-related bias as a “zero-sum game.” This is 
explained as “decreases in perceived bias against blacks over the past six decades as 
being associated with increases in perceived bias against whites.” Black people were not 
found to have this same perception of a relationship between biases. On the other hand, 
white people now feel that anti-white bias is a larger issue in society than anti-black bias 
(Norton and Sommers, 2011, p. 3).   
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Figure 5.2 White and Black respondents’ perceptions of anti-White and anti-Black 
bias in each decade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Norton, 2011  
As the figure above shows, white and black respondents both perceived anti-black 
bias as decreasing, but whites found this to be happening at a much faster pace. At the 
same time, black respondents continually observed anti-white bias to be non-existent and 
white respondents found it to be sharply increasing. This helps to explain the perceived 
relationship: “white respondents were more likely to see decreases in bias against blacks 
as related to increases in bias against whites—consistent with a zero-sum view of racism 
among whites,” (Norton, 2011). Norton described a concrete example of how this zero-
sum game perception of whites manifests in everyday life. “[White people] really see it 
as kind of a fixed pie of resources, a zero-sum game. One job for a black person equals 
one job that a white person didn’t get,” (Martin, 2011). Hochchild found a similar 
phenomenon in qualitative interviews with the white working class; people felt that 
minorities were “cutting them in line” (Hochschild, 2016).   
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 This trend is apparent in the legal system as well. Even though cases involving 
“reverse racism” go as far back as 1970, more recently these types of claims have 
increased, particularly in “high-profile” Supreme Court cases (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2004). These cases include components such as equal access to education in cases such as 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003 and Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, which addressed affirmative 
action at the University of Michigan (Oyez, 2003). Ricci v. DeStefano in 2009 addressed 
employment discrimination in a fire department promotion (Oyez, 2003).  In Fisher v. 
Texas, 2013, a college applicant filed suit against the University of Texas claiming that 
use of race in the admissions process violated the equal protection clause under the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Oyez, 2013).  These issues were hallmarks of the civil rights 
movement just decades ago (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Knowles, 2001).  
 This idea of “zero-sum” racism was also apparent in the three case studies. In 
Macomb, ideas that black people and immigrants were getting ahead at the expense of 
white people were showcased in Greenberg’s research as well as through sentiments that 
public officials conveyed in interviews. For example, one person mentioned, “I’m all for 
everybody having the American dream, but I feel that it’s being taken away from a lot of 
people by people coming and taking advantage.” In Cedar, public officials communicated 
that their constituents resented policies such as affirmative action and also spoke about 
concerns over terrorism. As one official described, the “us vs. them” narrative had a 
strong reverberation and acceptance. Granville County officials mentioned a growing 
resentment of welfare policy that to some seemed to disproportionately benefit blacks 
over whites.  
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 However, this growing trend in the perception of biases is not supported by 
measures of inequality. “From employment to police treatment, loan rates to education—
statistics continue to indicate drastically poorer outcomes for black than white 
Americans” (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Knowles, Persico, & Todd, 2001; 
Krueger, Rothstein, & Turner, 2006; Munnell, Tootell, Browne, & McEneaney, 1996). 
 Trump’s rhetoric and overall candidacy appealed to this increasingly popular 
perception and anxiety of status among the white working class. His “Make America 
Great Again” campaign slogan invoked sentiments of whiteness. Because of the 
pervasiveness of whiteness in America, sentiments about the race are often conveyed 
through nationalistic language (Valentino, 2017). Due to the ubiquitous nature of 
whiteness that permeates every aspect of American society, whiteness is difficult to map 
but is often used in speech about nationality in order to reinforce white dominance in 
U.S. society (Nakayama and Krizek, “Whiteness,” 2015). Trump utilized implicitly 
racialized sentiments to speak directly to the white working class. This includes rhetoric 
about the “golden ages” in American politics and “restoring order” in the U.S.  
Trump also spoke more directly about race throughout his campaign, announcing 
his candidacy with a speech that referred to Mexican immigrants as criminals and 
“rapists.” During his presidency, he called for less immigration from Haiti and Africa and 
more from Norway.  He questioned the birth certificate of Barack Obama and disparaged 
prominent African Americans for being unpatriotic and disrespectful. Further, he was 
endorsed by KKK leader David Duke and chose as his campaign head a leader at 
Breitbart focused on white nationalism (Leonhart and Philbrick, 2018).  
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The Russian government likely furthered this rhetoric in the 2016 election; their 
diffusion of news and propaganda did shift the discussion around the 2016 election. The 
misinformation and propaganda spread by the Russian government was readily received 
by a disillusioned and anxious group of white working class voters.  
 Importantly, while racial status was a large factor in the shift, commentators on 
the election have often neglected its role in the election. Many who voted for Trump 
would not label themselves or their peers as racists or bigots or perhaps even understand 
the implication of their vote: “One problem with understanding racism as only about 
prejudice involves the fact that one can be complicit in the perpetuation of racism even if 
one does not believe one is prejudiced. Most significantly, one can be complicit even if 
one has good intentions” (Applebaum, 2016). 
4. White status anxiety and the “zero-sum game” are results of historical systems   
 This white status anxiety, significant enough to shift a presidential election, was 
not born overnight. It has been structurally embedded into society, specifically those in 
the white working class, since the 1600s. Michelle Alexander argues that the systematic 
oppression of African Americans was created in order to drive a wedge between a 
powerful alliance of poor whites and slaves and indentured servants. By creating this 
system of privilege, whites did not necessarily have a better economic position, but they 
were situated in a better place than slaves and indentured servants (Alexander, 2011, p. 
25).  
Following the reconstruction system when African-Americans started to gain 
economic and political power, the Jim Crow system was created. Once again, the effort 
was driven by white elites in a move to eliminate an alliance of poor people across races. 
The discriminatory barriers created allowed poor whites to retain a sense of superiority 
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over African-Americans and redirected their hostilities from the elite class to black 
citizens (Alexander, 2011, p. 34). By the Civil War, whiteness was positioned firmly as a 
central value, founded on both “economic exploitation” and “racial folklore” (Roediger, 
2007 pg. 15). Today, it remains a central value in American culture, apparent by the 
racial rhetoric from Trump that Americans (most notably, but not only, the white working 
class) responded to positively.  
The shift from Obama to Trump could be linked to how the white working class 
was formed. Giving a preferential status to poor whites over blacks created a perception 
among whites that their status is directly and negatively correlated to that of blacks. 
Although a popular notion exists that Obama’s 2008 victory was a clear indicator of a 
“postracial America,” data from Norton’s ‘zero-sum’ study suggests that “many whites 
believe that the pendulum has now swung beyond equality in the direction of anti-white 
discrimination” (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004).  
Not only have historical institutions created an anxiety over white status relative 
to minorities, but they have also created anxiety over changing gender status. Gender 
clearly played a role in the 2016 election, as it has in every election before it— we still 
have not elected a female president in the United States. In the 2016 election, Trump 
appealed to masculine and sexist sentiment, as evidenced by a myriad of comments that 
reduced professional women to their appearance, for example. In case studies some 
officials addressed the role of gender in the 2016 election. One female official in 
Granville noted, “At times it’s hard to accept the fact that women that have opinions and 
visions about ideas and government—that’s just a historical thing.”  
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Gender inequality has persisted in American institutions and systems from the 
lagging right to vote, to unequal pay, to far less women in political and business 
leadership (Bracic et al., 2018, p. 5). Studies find a positive and significant relationship 
between sexism in the political realm and vote choice, and favorability towards Trump; 
this relationship is strongest among white voters (Bracic et al., 2018, p. 11).  
This racial and gender hierarchy perceived by working class whites has survived 
through the 21st century. Now, policies that equalize black citizens, immigrants and even 
women seem like a direct attack to whites’ privileged status, which those in lower 
economic positions do not feel they can afford to lose. The election of Obama seemed to 
draw out voters that felt they had the most to lose after his victories. Ta-Nehisi Coates 
writes in We Were Eight Years in Power (2017) that understanding Obama’s presidency 
only as symbolic fails to recognize the power of symbols. “The symbolic power of 
Barack Obama’s presidency—that whiteness was no longer strong enough to prevent 
peons from taking up residence in the castle—assaulted the most deeply rooted notions of 
white supremacy and instilled fear in its adherents and beneficiaries.” 
Whites view the usurpers of their status to blacks, minorities, and for some, 
women. Trump stoked the flames of the fears of working class whites around the loss of 
this status and at the same time, promised to stomp out the fire.  
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
 
Conclusion  
There is no shortage to the literature and theory written about the 2016 election 
results. These range from musings on American populism and the economy, to Russian 
influence, to sexism and the failings of the Democratic Party. However, understanding 
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the 2016 election through the lens of white status anxiety helps to interpret a number of 
these complicated phenomena. Changing demographics and increasing influence of 
minorities and women in society produced an anxiety that most profoundly influenced the 
white working class voters who handed the election from the first African American 
President to Donald Trump. American voters, primarily in the white working class, 
subscribed to the logic of the “zero-sum game.”  This logic spells out that when 
minorities—primarily black, immigrant and Hispanic groups—benefit from American 
institutions or advance in society, this is detrimental to the position of whites in the 
working class. Historical systems of discrimination have privileged whites with a status 
above that of minorities; anxiety stems from environments and policies that threaten it.   
Case studies allowed for a greater understanding of context and the underlying 
tension among racial status occurring in all three counties. Trump’s racial-nationalist 
populism and rhetoric called these voters, who had likely never felt asked to vote before, 
to turnout for the election. Anxiety over race, status and gender drove these white 
working-class voters to back a candidate who symbolically and functionally protected 
their status. Importantly, many factors—including the economy, populism and gender—
did interact to influence the election results. However, most of the discussion around the 
2016 election does not directly address race and white status anxiety, both as a driver of 
the shift from Obama to Trump or as a symptom of American culture and policy. This 
thesis directly addresses the 2016 election as a result of white status anxiety in America 
and dispels any notions that American society is post-racial. Unlike a great deal of 
scholarship on the topic, this thesis grapples with race not only as its own issue, but an 
integral aspect of most areas of policy.  
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Policy Implications  
This finding—the centrality of race in both policy and politics—has several 
policy implications. The first is the permanent nature of policy, if not in law, then in 
culture. Policies created around race since the nation’s formation have seeped into our 
culture. If anything, this thesis should illustrate the reverberations of policies that target 
racial out-groups in all aspects of cultural systems and institutions. This should serve as a 
forewarning to all policy actors: the permanent nature of policy should be considered in 
every piece of legislation. In creating and enacting policy, an awareness of future 
interpretation and consequences should be regarded with the highest consideration. While 
policymakers may understand this in theory, these considerations are often not 
thoughtfully exercised.  
Another important policy implication highlighted by my findings is the need to 
talk more candidly about race in America. After Barack Obama was elected, some 
Americans shifted their perception to believe that the United States had become a post-
racial society. This perception created an interpretation of a growing anti-white bias. This 
notion bred hostilities, primarily among the white working class. However, this attitude 
largely has been ignored both intentionally and recklessly. As a nation, we have not 
talked candidly about the issue of race, which touches nearly every facet of society. It 
underlies discussions about the economy, welfare policy, education, housing, judicial 
systems and law and order. As the United States continues to become more and more 
diverse in its makeup, the nation cannot  continue to ignore race and racism, or to isolate 
discussions of race from other major policy areas. As our policymakers debate policy 
choices in these areas, they should apply the lens of racial equity to understand and 
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evaluate the likely impact—both in the short- and long-term—of the decisions they are 
making.  
Failure to make good policy often arises from a misinterpretation of what 
symptoms need to be addressed. In order to make policy that will be the most impactful, 
we need to grapple with the symptoms arising from racial anxiety and tensions. This 
racial anxiety is an integral piece of society and, in 2016, it manifested in the election of 
Donald Trump.  
Limitations  
One limitation of this study is the inability to analyze each county that shifted 
from Obama to Trump. Due to resource and time constraints, I relied on the three case 
studies to extrapolate trends from in order to draw conclusions about the overall shift in 
the United States. In the case studies themselves, I was limited to data gathered by the 
U.S. Census, which was not always available for more current years. I was unable to 
obtain some kinds of information, such as welfare recipient data in some counties and 
more detailed breakdowns of demographics in the labor market. Additionally, there is 
only so much publically available data on voting. Since it is not possible to understand 
exactly who voted in each election, information on “different voters” can be inferred, but 
not proven.  
Finally, personal bias can also be considered a limitation in this study. While this 
often happens subconsciously, bias can color perception of information and data. This 
could have impacted my interpretation of information and led me to focus on some 
patterns above others. Of course, I attempted to be as objective as possible in my research 
and analysis. 
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APPENDICES  
 
APPENDIX A: Public Official Interview Questionnaire Survey  
 
My interviews will be semi-structured and with public officials in Macomb, Michigan; 
Cedar, Iowa; and Granville, North Carolina counties. I will ask the following set of 
questions and beyond this allow the interviewees to share additional information at their 
will.  
 
1. What is your name, age, race, and current or previously held government position?  
2.  What were your responsibilities in your role?  
3.. What influential/notable policies were implemented during your tenor (major policy 
changes that may have caused controversies), particularly those affecting local 
populations?  
4.  Was there a change in federal funding of important/key programs in your county from 
2008-2016 or your time in office?  
5.  Serious of questions on observations in shifts  
n Did you notice any major demographic shifts in your county from 2008-2016? 
n Did you notice any major economic shifts in your country from 2008-2016? This 
could involve job creation/destruction on any significant levels, movement of a 
factory or large company, spurt of new businesses, changes in unemployment 
rates etc?  
n Did you notice any major environmental changes in your county from 2008-
2016? (Pollution, major weather events or changes)  
n Did you notice any major cultural shifts in your county from 2008-2016?  
n Were there any major changes in the relationship between private and public 
sectors from 2008-2016?  
n Was there a leadership shift in local governance from 2008-2016?  
n Was there any influx of new media from 2008-2016?  
n Were there any changes in average level of education in the county from 2008-
2016? (Including drop-out rates, college attendance etc)  
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APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY DATA  
 
B1. Macomb County  
 
Figure B1.1 Macomb County Racial Characteristics  
Race  2000  2010  2012-2016  Percent of Total 
Population in 
2012-2016 
White  728,420  717,973 711,089  82.71% 
African-
American  
20,328 72,723 91,582 10.65%  
Hispanic 
(Ethnicity)  
12,510 19,095 21,027 2.45%  
Asian  17,378 25,063 30,459 3.54%  
Native-
Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander  
133 179 224 0.03% 
American 
Indian or 
Alaskan Native  
2,834 2,646 2,136 0.25% 
Some other 
Race  
 
3,345 4,760  4,116 0.48%  
Two or more 
Races  
15,721 17,634 20,097 2.34% 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016. Policy Map, 2018 
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Figure B1.2 Age Distribution in Macomb County 
Age  Number of People in Age 
Group  
Percent of People in Age 
Group  
Under 5  47,529 5.53% 
Under 18  188,610 21.94% 
Working Age (18-64)  537,242 62.49% 
Aging (65+)  133,851 15.57% 
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016. Policy Map, 2018 
 
Figure B1.3 Macomb County Incomes  
Median Income 2012-2016: $55,951 
2012-2016 Annual Income Category  Percent of Households  
Less than $25,000 20.22% 
$25,000 - $34,999 10.35% 
$35,000 - $49,000 14.13% 
$50,000 - $74,999 
 
19.27% 
$75,000 - $99,999 13.27% 
$100,000 - $124,999 9.17% 
$125,000 - $149,999 5.53% 
$150,000 or more  8.07% 
 
SOURCE: Census American Community Survey, 2016, Policy Map, 2018 
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Figure B1.4 Macomb Employment 2012-2016  
Employment by 
Industry  
People Employed  Percent Employed in 
Industry  
Manufacturing Industry 
Employment  
84,523 20.69%  
Heath Care and Social 
Assistance Industry 
Employment 
60,583 14.83% 
Retail Trade Industry 
Employment  
47,312 11.58% 
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016; Policy Map, 2018 
 
Figure B1.5 Percent Non-White Population in Macomb County  
 
  Percent Non-White Population 
 2000  2007-2011  2010  2012-2016  
Macomb, MI    7.58% 13.9% 14.63% 17.29% 
Sterling Heights, MI (city) 9.79% 14.92% 14.86% 15.25% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
 
Figure B1.6 Percent Population 18-20 Years Old in Macomb County  
 
 Percent Population 18-20 Years Old  
 2000  2007-2011  2010  2012-2016  
Macomb, MI    3.37% 3.66%  3.7%  3.33%  
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
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Figure B1.7 Presidential Election by Macomb County Major Precincts  
 Sterling Heights  
 2008  2012  2016  
Winner  Obama  Obama  Trump  
# Votes for Winner 32,009  29,181  31,496  
 Shelby  
 2008  2012  2016  
Winner  McCain  Romney  Trump  
# Votes for Winner  20,607  22,420  25,379 
 Clinton  
 2008  2012  2016  
Winner  Obama  Obama  Trump  
# Votes for Winner  27,722  25,678  24,520 
 Warren  
 2008  2012  2016  
Winner  Obama  Obama  Clinton  
# Votes for Winner  36,901  35,850  31,212 
 Macomb Township  
 2008  2012  2016  
Winner  Obama  Romney  Trump  
# Votes for Winner  19,579 22,271 27,472 
 Roseville  
 2008  2012  2016  
	 134 
Winner  Obama  Obama  Clinton  
# Votes for Winner  13,739 12,736 10,386  
 St. Clair Shores  
 2008 2012  2016  
Winner  Obama  Obama  Trump  
# Votes for Winner  18,531  16,991  18,078  
SOURCE: Macomb County Clerk, 2016  
 
Figure B1.8 Jobs in All Industries in Macomb County  
 
 Jobs in All Industries  
 2010  2011 2012 2013 2014  2015 
Macomb, MI  267,058 272,047   300,613  303,960  309,498  318.622 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
 
Figure B1.9 Percent Heath Care and Social Assistance Industry Employment in 
Macomb County  
 
SOURCE: US BLS, 2016  
 
 Percent Health Care and Social Assistance Industry 
Employment  
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Macomb, MI   9.73%  14.11% 14.83% 
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Figure B1.10 Percent Manufacturing Industry Employment Macomb County  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017  
 
B2. Cedar County  
 
Figure B2.1 Cedar County Racial Characteristics  
Race  2000  2010  2012-2016  Percent of Total 
Population in 
2012-2016 
White  17,948  18,090 17,852 97.08% 
African-
American  
13 52 108 0.59% 
Hispanic 
(Ethnicity) 
171 284 334 1.82% 
Asian  52 85 149 0.81% 
Native-Hawaiian 
or Alaskan Native 
19 3 0 0% 
American Indian 
or Alaskan Native  
26 29 27 0.15% 
Some other Race  
 
46 43 57  0.31% 
Two or more 
Races  
83 197 196 1.07% 
 Percent Manufacturing Industry Employment 
 2000  2007-2011  2012-2016  
Macomb, MI   26.11%  20.27% 20.69% 
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SOURCE: Policy Map, 2017 
 
Figure B2.2 Age Distribution in Cedar  
Age  Number of People in 
Age Group  
Percent of People in 
Age Group  
Under 5  971 5.28% 
Under 18  4,261 23.17% 
Working Age (18-64)  10,779 58.62% 
Aging (65+)  3,349 18.21% 
SOURCE: Policy Map Report, 2017  
 
Figure B2.3 Cedar County Incomes  
Median Income 2012-2016: $50,317  
2012-2016 Annual Income Category  Percent of Households  
Less than $25,000 16.12% 
$25,000 - $34,999 8.47% 
$35,000 - $49,000 13.28% 
$50,000 - $74,999 
 
25.63% 
$75,000 - $99,999 15.07% 
$100,000 - $124,999 11% 
$125,000 - $149,999 4.51% 
$150,000 or more  5.91% 
SOURCE: Census American Community Survey, 2016 
 
Figure B2.4 United States Presidential Elections in Cedar County  
 2008  2012  2016  
Election Winner  Obama  Obama  Trump  
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% Votes for Winner  54.02%  51.2%  55.5%  
Number of Votes  9665  9,702  9,541  
SOURCE: Cedar County Clerk, 2016  
 
 
Figure B2.5 Cedar Employment 2012-2016  
Employment by 
Industry  
People Employed  Percent Employed in 
Industry  
Manufacturing Industry 
Employment 
1,542 15.53% 
Health Care and Social 
Assistance Industry 
Employment  
1,417 14.27% 
Retail Trade Industry 
Employment  
1,333 13.42% 
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016; Policy Map, 2018 
 
Figure B2.6 Percent of Jobs in Retail Trade in Cedar County  
 Percent of Jobs in Retail Trade  
2003 2006 2009 2013 2015 
Cedar, IA  17.18%  13.52% 14.29% 13.67% 14.3% 
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Figure B2.6 Percent of Population Receiving Food Stamps in Cedar County  
 Percent of Population Receiving Food Stamps  
2000 2005 2010  2012 2015 
Cedar, IA  2.37%  3.9% 7.52% 8.5% 7.59% 
SOURCE: US BLS, 2015; Policy Map, 2017  
 
B3. Granville County  
 
Figure B3.1 Granville County Racial Characteristics  
Race  2000  2010  2012-2016  Percent of 
Total 
Population in 
2012-2016 
White  29,199  36,205 35,739 61.26% 
African-
American  
16,710 19,652 17,960 30.78% 
Hispanic 
(Ethnicity)  
2,102 4,482 4,365 7.48%  
Asian  198 326 248 0.43% 
Native-
Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander  
56 34 23 0.04% 
American 
Indian or 
Alaskan Native  
234 338 356 0.61% 
Some other 
Race  
 
1,573 2,323 1,885 3.23% 
Two or more 
Races  
528 1,038 2,130 3.65%  
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics; Policy Map, 2017 
 
Figure B3.2 Age Distribution in Granville  
Age  Number of People in 
Age Group  
Percent of People in 
Age Group  
Under 5  2,915 5%  
Under 18  12,506 21.44% 
Working Age (18-64)  36,882 63.22%  
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Aging (65+)  8,953 15.35%  
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016. Policy Map, 2018 
 
 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016. Policy Map, 2018 
 
Figure B3.4 Granville Employment 2012-2016  
Employment by 
Industry  
People Employed  Percent Employed in 
Industry  
Heath Care and Social 
Assistance Industry 
Employment  
4,285 17.43% 
Manufacturing Industry 
Employment  
3,887 15.81%  
Retail Trade Industry 
Employment  
2,498 10.16%  
Figure B3.3 Granville County Incomes  
Median Income 2012-2016: $50,317  
2012-2016 Annual Income Category  Percent of Households  
Less than $25,000 23.75% 
$25,000 - $34,999 11.95% 
$35,000 - $49,000 13.95% 
$50,000 - $74,999 
 
19.66%  
$75,000 - $99,999 12.81% 
$100,000 - $124,999 8.15%  
$125,000 - $149,999 4.44%  
$150,000 or more  5.3%  
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SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2016; Policy Map, 2018 
 
Figure B3.5 Percent of Jobs in Health Care and Social Assistance in Granville  
 
 Percent of Jobs in Health Care and Social Assistance  
2003 2006 2009 2013 2015 
Granville, NC   17.9%  17.81% 22.5% 17.64% 17.97% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics; Policy Map, 2017 
 
Figure B3.6 Percent of Jobs in Retail Trade in Granville County  
 
 Percent of Jobs in Retail Trade  
2003 2006 2009 2013 2015 
Granville, NC   10.97%  10.25% 9.95% 8.44% 10.4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics, 2016 ; Policy Map, 2017 
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Figure B3.7 Average Wage in Manufacturing in Granville County  
 Average Wage in Manufacturing   
2000 2005 2010 2012 2016 
Granville, NC   $34,985  $40,076 $45,791 $47,869 $55,097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau Of Labor Statistics, 2016 ; Policy Map, 2017 
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APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS    
 
Figure C1.1 Income Inequality in Macomb, Cedar, Granville and the US 
 
 Income Inequality Index (2010)  
 Macomb, MI  Cedar, IA  Granville, NC  United States  
Gini Index of 
Income 
Inequality 
0.43 0.37 0.43 0.48 
Ranking  1909/3220 3178/3220 1909/3220 N/A  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Census, 2010; Policy Map 2018 
 
 
Figure C1.2 Percent of Eligible Voters Who Say They Voted, 2016 Presidential 
Election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE:	Pew Research Center analysis of Current Population Survey, 1988-2016	
